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ABSTRACT
SITUATING THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: 
THE TURKISH CASE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
Aslı Özgür Peker
Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration
Supervisor: Fuat Keyman
September 1998
This thesis adresses the question of national identity 
in contemporary Turkey, with reference to the impact of 
globalization on national identity in general. It is 
suggested that globalization has a fragmenting effect 
on national identities and Turkey is also effected from 
this process. As a result of both the challenge of 
globalization and internal dynamics, Kemalism as the 
dominant code of definition of national identity in 
Turkey, faces a crisis. The thesis also adresses some 
recent developments in Turkey such as the strengthening 
of political Islam, the Kurdish movement, and the rise 
of Turkish nationalism within the framework of the 
above argument.
Keywords: National identity, globalization, Kemalism
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ÖZET
ULUSAL KİMLİK SORUNU:
KÜRESEL BAĞLAMDA TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ
Aslı Özgür PEKER
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Fuat Keyman
Eylül 1998
Bu çalışma, küreselleşme sürecinin genel olarak ulusal 
kimlik üzerindeki etkileri çerçevesinde, günümüz 
Türkiye'sinde ulusal kimlik sorununu ele almaktadır. 
Çalışmada, küreselleşmenin ulusal kimlikler üzerinde 
parçalayıcı bir etkisi olduğu ve Türkiye'nin de bu 
süreçten benzer şekilde etkilendiği önerilmektedir. 
Küreselleşmenin ve çeşitli iç dinamiklerin ortak bir 
sonucu olarak Türkiye'de baskın ulusal kimlik 
tanımlamasının çerçevesini oluşturan Kemalizm bir 
krizle karşı karşıyadır. Bu argüman çerçevesinde 
çalışma, ayrıca, siyasi İslam'ın güçlenmesi, Kürt 
hareketi ve Türk milliyetçiliğinin yükselmesi gibi 
kimi güncel olguları da konu edinmektedir.
Anahtar kelimeler; 
Kemalizm
Ulusal kimlik, küreselleşme.
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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, everybody wants to talk about 
identity. Being a key word of contemporary 
politics, identity is associated with so many 
different connotations that it sometimes comes out 
that people are not even talking about the same 
thing. At least one thing is clear -identity, only 
when it is in crisis, when a process of doubt and 
ambiguity takes the place of something that is 
assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable, becomes 
a question. From that point of view, the 
enthusiasm to talk about identity is the symptom 
of the postmodern impasse of contemporary 
politics.^
Beginning with 1980s, Turkey has experienced a 
period of important transformations. The decade started 
with the 1980 military coup, and under the conditions 
of military rule (and later, under the government of 
Motherland Party) serious economic and social measures 
were taken. The traditional economic model of import- 
substitution was replaced with the export oriented one, 
urban population has increased, communication networks 
developed. On the other hand, Islam was articulated to 
the official ideology in order to function as cement to 
assure and strengthen national unity. Towards the 
middle of the decade, many economic and social 
indicators were pointing to an improvement.
 ^ Kobena Mercer, "Cangxla Hoşgeldiniz: Postmodern Politikada 
Kimlik ve Çeşitlilik," in Kimlik: Topluluk, Kültür, Farklılık, ed. 
Jonathan Rutherford (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1998), 49
As a result, as Tanil Bora claims, Turkey has entered 
1990s with a strong self-confidence.^ The capital 
accumulation caused by New Right policies of the 1980s, 
the distance taken in the path of articulation with 
global capital, the improvements in some sectors of 
economy, the modernisation and expansion of consumption 
created an optimistic atmosphere. The application to 
European Union for full membership was made in such an 
atmosphere. Turkey was at last entering the "first 
league" of nations. The situation in USSR and emerging 
Turkic states further accelerated the optimism. There 
was a growing belief that "the 21®'" Century would be 
the century of the Turks".
However, the optimism and self-confidence of 1980s 
soon turned into frustration. Turkey's membership to EU 
was not accepted and the relations with Turkic 
Republics failed to fulfil the expectations. Similarly, 
the outcomes of the Gulf War were a frustration for 
Turkey. Neither in the economic sphere did the positive 
atmosphere long live. As a result, the early optimism 
and confidence of 1980s were soon replaced by ambiguity 
and frustration and the term "crisis", together with
Tanrl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati." Birikim. 
67(November 1994)^ 10
various adjectives, has become frequently employed in 
order to explain the current situation in the country.
The notion of "identity crisis" has been one of 
the approaches in explaining the social unrest. What 
brought the concept of identity under question were the 
challenges to the national identity as it was
formulated by Kemalism as a result of both inner 
dynamics and global ones. In the last two decades, 
Turkey experienced a realisation of the fact that the 
society was not as homogeneous as it was suggested by 
the official discourse.^ Two critical dynamics behind 
this realisation have been the rise of political Islam 
and the Kurdish movement. Both developments have raised 
questions about Turkish national identity. The rise of 
alternative identities and their increasing efforts to 
be represented in the public sphere has challenged the 
homogeneous definition of Turkish nation. Further more, 
such a questioning had an important implication on 
state legitimacy as the latter was based on the 
principle of national unity. Therefore, as Levent Kdker 
claims, the ability of the state, defined as the 
organised political-institutional form of the nation as
 ^Levent Köker, "Kimlik Krizinden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm ve 
Sonrası." Toplum ve Bilim. 71(1996), 150
a homogeneous unity and also the guarantor of that 
unity, to reproduce its legitimacy diminished while the 
significance of social-cultural differences 
accelerated.^
Together with the frustrations that emerged in the 
process of articulation with the global capitalism, the 
crisis even grew deeper. As Sevda Alanku§ Rural claims, 
Turkey, unable to locate itself into the global, was 
now also unable to show a place to the emerging 
localities within its territory.^ Those dislocated 
with the process of globalization, with their 
reactionarily redefined identities, on the one hand, 
were spreading their forms of solidarity in the civil 
society and on the other hand, struggling with their 
coomunication organs, political parties, associations 
and representatives in order to be included public 
sphere.®
Within such a picture of the last two decades, 
what this thesis aims to do is to understand the above 
summarised developments of the post 1980 period in 
Turkey and to locate them into the process of Turkey's
 ^ibid., 150-151
' Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler ve Yurttaşlar 
Demokrasisi." Birikim. 71-72(March-April 1995), 90
® ibid., 90
articulation with global capitalism. To offer a deep 
analytical account of the socio-economic dynamics 
giving rise to those developments goes well beyond the 
scope of this study. What is tried to do instead is to 
address the question of national identity within the 
broader framework of globalization.
With such a goal in hand, the thesis is based upon 
an extensive reading and interpretation of the 
available literature on the question of national 
identity. Through the critical and extensive readings, 
my focus will be on what was said in the available 
literature with a special reference to globalization. 
In doing so, I would like to emphasise the connection 
between globalization and the emergence of an 'identity 
crisis' in Turkey. In the literature that I rely upon, 
it is usually the historical dynamics that are 
emphasised as the reason behind the identity crisis. 
Hence, I believe that my thesis will contribute to the 
literature by establishing the link between the 
globalization process and the challenges to national 
identity.
I will substantiate my argument first by 
developing a general understanding of the tension 
between globalization and national identity. Hence, I 
will begin with the general question of national
identity within the modern framework. The constitution 
of national identity on the general framework of 
Western Enlightenment and its adaptation by non-Western 
countries is discussed in the first chapter. What 
follows is an evaluation of the cultural impacts of the 
process of globalization leaving the economical and 
political dynamics aside. This is not to overlook the 
"questions of power and questions of appropriation 
which ...are lodged at the very centre of any notion of a 
shift between the dispositions of the local and the 
global in the emergence of a cultural politics on a 
world scale"', but rather, it is a conscious limitation 
to keep in line with the scope and purpose of the 
study. Within such a framework, the understanding of 
globalization as a twofold, or rather, contradictory 
process, including both universalistic and 
particularistic dynamics, is adopted. Next, the impact 
of globalization on national identity and the 
challenges it poses on national unity are questioned.
Having examined the tension between globalization 
and national identity, the second chapter addresses the 
question of national identity in Turkey, namely how it
' Stuart Hall, "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities," 
in Culture, Globalization and the World System, ed. A. D. King 
USA: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 41
was formulated by Kemalism with reference to the 
constitution period of the Republic. Although it is not 
assumed that Kemalism and its definition of national 
identity remained unchanged until today, the main 
reference is to the early years of the Republic because 
the basic premises of national identity are more or 
less the same and are adopted by many of the Kemalist 
intellectuals in the recent debates about national 
identity. In line with such an understanding, first, 
the general framework on which Kemalism rests is 
evaluated. This is done with reference to Western 
positivism and modernisation theory. Next, Kemalist 
definition of national identity is taken into 
consideration, with its emphasis on homogeneity and 
unity. Accepting that identities are defined and 
redefined against the 'other', the question of the 
'other' for Kemalist national identity is addressed 
lastly.
The third chapter begins with a brief historical 
review of Turkey until 1980s. What is attempted is to 
offer an introductory summary of the period rather than 
a deep analytical account of the economical, political 
and social developments and the stress is more on the 
post-1980 period. The reason behind this is that, 
although the period between 1930s and 1980 was marked
with crucial transformations for Turkey, when the 
question of national identity is considered, 1980 
appears to be the turning point. Until 1980s, although 
some developments occurred with implications on the 
definition national identity, there has not been a 
serious challenge to the Kemalist understanding.® 
Besides, the notion of identity crisis has not been one 
of the main topics in the political agenda of the 
related period. Only with the developments after 1980, 
the very grounds that the Kemalist national identity 
rests on have begun to shake and its ability to 
reproduce its legitimacy has diminished. By 1990s, the 
notion of identity crisis became widely pronounced as a 
tool to understand the current situation in Turkey. 
Therefore, it is the post-1980 period that is evaluated 
in more detail. Putting the emphasis on that period, 
first, the social, economic and cultural 
transformations that Turkey has experienced will be 
evaluated. Then, the impacts of these transformations 
on national identity are to be considered. In line with 
this goal, the debates on Second Republic, the rise of
 ^Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) 
Identity in Turkey," New Perspectives on Turkey. 13(Fall 1995)
Islam and Kurdish question will each be discussed 
separately.
The fourth chapter will cover the same period of 
time, but this time with a different question in hand. 
Seemingly but not really paradoxically, the decade 
marked with the challenges to national identity and 
erosion of its legitimacy, is also a decade of the rise 
of nationalism. The reaction to the rise of alternative 
conceptualisations of collective identity, together 
with other dynamics, results in a restrengthening of 
nationalism. However, nationalism is not a united 
block. Rather, what is at stake is a struggle among 
different nationalisms to become hegemonic. I will 
evaluate these different versions of nationalism with 
their strengths and weaknesses in the struggle for 
hegemony.
Following out the steps outlined above, what is 
attempted to do in this study is to understand the 
current situation in Turkey, labelled as an "identity 
crisis", and to locate it into the process of Turkey's 
articulation with global dynamics in the post-1980 
period. It is suggested that the simultaneous 
development of the two processes, that is to say, the 
increasingly felt effects of globalization and 
problématisation of the notion of national identity is
not merely a coincidence but rather, the former has 
been influential in the emergence of the latter. 
Similarly, the current questions in Turkey such as the 
strengthening of Islamic identity, the Kurdish movement 
and the rise of Turkish nationalism are evaluated 
within this broader framework, as the outcomes of the 
same process.
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CHAPTER I
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON 
NATIONAL IDENTITY
Globalization has been employed by many scholars 
as a key word in understanding the social, economical 
and political developments in the contemporary world. 
On the one hand, it is argued that as a result of the 
process of globalization, the era of the nation-state 
is over, and we are entering a new world of economic 
giants and superpowers, of multinationals and military 
blocks, of vast communications networks and 
international division of labor. In such a world there 
is no room for medium or small scale state let alone 
submerged ethnic communities and their competing and 
divisive nationalisms.^ On the other hand an
alternative perspective claims that globalization 
involves an opposite dynamic which results in a re-
’ A. D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" in Global Culture, ed. 
M. Featherstone, (London, Sage Publications,1990),175
11
emergence of nationalism, ethnic and religious 
identities.
What we actually witness in the recent years is, 
on the one hand, a rise of ethnic and religious 
nationalisms and their struggles to built nation-states 
on these basis. On the other hand, the already existing 
nation-states experience an identity crisis. They face 
the problem of recognizing cultural differences in the 
public sphere which conflicts with the principle of 
national unity on which most of those nation-states 
were built upon.
Hence the interaction between globalization and 
national identity is quite problematic, shaped by 
tensions and contradictions. Assuming that the recent 
challenges to national identity in Turkey is closely 
related to its experience with globalization, it 
becomes crucial to have a closer examination of this 
problematic relation between national identity and 
globalization.
1.1 National Identity within the Modern Framework
The age of modernity has been the age of nations. 
The nations, nation-states, and national identities 
have constituted an important part of our understanding
12
of the modern world. Contrary to the impression it 
leaves, these are quite new phenomena, with only a 
short history. As Wallerstein claims, "a world 
consisting of these nation-states came into existence 
even partially only in the sixteenth century. Such a 
world was theorised and became a matter of widespread 
consciousness even later, only in the nineteenth 
century. It became an inescapably universal phenomenon 
later still, in fact only after 1945."^ '^
In spite of its relatively short history, 
nationalism succeeded in becoming the norm throughout 
the world. What is more striking is that we came to 
conceive nationalism and national identities as 
ahistorical, natural phenomena which have existed all 
through the time. As Ernest Gellner claims:
The idea of man without a nation seems to 
impose a (great) strain on the modern imagination. 
A man must have a nationality as he must have a 
nose and two ears. All this seems obvious, though, 
alas, it is not true. But that it should have come 
to seem so very obviously true is indeed an 
aspect, perhaps the very core, of the problem of 
nationalism. Having a nation is not an inherent 
attribute of humanity, but it has now come to
appear as such. 11
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can 
There Be Such a Thing As World Culture?," in Culture,
Globalization and the World System, ed. A. D. King (USA: MacMillan 
Education Ltd, 1991), 92
Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in Modernity 
and Its Futures, eds. Stuart Hall, David Held and T. McGrew 
(Cambridge, Polity, 1992), 291, 292
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If one feature of national identity is its 
existence as an ahistorical, natural entity, one other 
is its claim to homogeneity. It defines the nation as 
an integrated whole, with a fixed and stable unity. 
Another element of national identity is the idea of 
progress. A belief in continuous progress is internal 
to the definition of national identity. These features, 
when taken together, remind us the basic premises of 
Western modernity as it was built on the basis of the 
Enlightenment. Therefore, it would be helpful to begin 
with the development of the individual subject within 
modernity before looking in detail to these basic 
features of national identity.
Using Stuart Hall's argument, the unified form and 
rational identity of the human subject was presupposed 
by and essential to both the discourses of modern 
thought and to the process which shaped modernity. The 
subject has shifted three strategic points during 
modernity. The modern age gave rise to a new and 
decisive form of individualism, at the centre of which 
stood a new conception of the individual subject and 
its identity. The development of modernity freed the 
individual from pre-modern traditions and structures. 
The birth of the sovereign individual between the 
Renaissance humanism of the 16*^*' century and the
14
Enlightenment of the century represented a
significant break with the past. Some argue that it was 
the engine, which set the whole social system of 
modernity in motion.
This new formulation of the subject had two 
distinct meanings:
1) the subject as an indivisible and unified whole
2) the subject as a singular, unique, distinctive 
entity
Different developments contributed to this new 
formulation: the Reformation and Protestantism freed
the subject from religion. Renaissance humanism put 
"Man" at the centre of the universe. Scientific 
revolutions gave the capacity to inquire into mysteries 
of nature. And the Enlightenment emphasized the image 
of rational, scientific Man, freed from dogma and 
intolerance, before whom human history was laid out for 
understanding and mastery.
So was the Cartesian subject formulated by 
Descartes, as a rational, cognitive and conscious 
subject at the centre of knowledge: "I think, therefore 
I am".
As modern societies grew more complex, the 
definition of the individual subject acquired a more 
collective and social form to adjust to the structures
15
of the nation-state. With this adjustment, the 
individual was now more located into the modern 
society. This helped to internalise the outside within 
the subject and externalise the inside world of the 
subject through action in the social world.
So the Enlightenment understanding of the subject 
was based on the conception of human person as a fully 
centred, unified individual; endowed with the 
capacities of reason, consciousness and action, whose 
centre consisted of an inner core which first emerged 
when the subject was born, and unfolded with it, while 
remaining essentially the same. With the sociological 
contributions to this definition, the inner core of the 
subject was no longer seen as autonomous but as 
developed in relation to others. This was an attempt to 
bridge the gap between inside and outside making both 
reciprocally more unified and predictable.^·^
The formulation of national identity followed the 
basic premises of the Enlightenment and its 
construction of the individual subject. It defined the 
nation as a unified, homogeneous, fixed entity, it 
defined the population as homogeneous, sharing a common 
descent, a common history, with common expectations
ibid., 281-285
16
from the future and a common identity. The idea of
progress was a major element in this definition. The 
nation was defined as ahistorical, always-ever
existing. It had a stable essence, a core and although 
it changed by time, it essentially remained the same.
Stuart Hall defines five aspects of how such a 
national identity is constituted:
1. It is constituted through told and retold national
histories, literatures, the media and popular
culture.
2. It is constituted through the emphasis on the
origins, continuity, tradition, and timelessness.
3. It is constituted through the invention of 
tradition.
4. It is constituted through a foundational myth, a
story which locates the origins of the people so 
early in time that they are lost in the midst of 
mythic time
5. It is constituted through the idea of a pure,
original people or 'folk'.^ "*
In this way, national identity presents itself as 
perfectly natural, condensed, homogenous and unitary. 
However, as Hall claims, "It was always negotiated
ibid., 293-295
17
against difference. It always had to absorb all the 
differences of class, of region, of gender, in order to 
present itself as a homogenous entity.
By identifying modernity with progress and by 
putting Reason at the core of its definition. Western 
national identity has been constituted as opposed to 
its backward, traditional other, that is to say, the 
Orient. On the other hand, national identity in the 
Third World has also been defined within the same 
premises of Western modernity. As Chatterjee claims, 
the nationalist thought in the Third World, which is 
often thought as the major source of resistance against 
the colonial West, can not break its tie with the 
universality claim of Western modernity. The essential 
question for Chatterjee is, therefore, why non-Western 
countries should have no alternative other than trying 
to approximate the given properties of modernity. 
According to Chatterjee, the question of nationalist 
thought is only a part of a more general, epistemic 
problem which results from the constitution of 
'universal' thought on the basis of a bourgeois-
Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and 
Ethnicity," in Culture, Globalization and the World System, ed. 
A.D. King, (USA: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 22
Partha Chatterjee, Milliyetçi Düşünce ve Sömürge Dünyası, 
(İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 32
18
rationalist conceptualisation of knowledge after the 
European Enlightenment. This is a knowledge announcing 
its own universality; it claims validity regardless of 
cultures. National thought, accepting to be 'modern', 
also accepts this universality claim of modern 
knowledge. But, at the same time, it assumes the 
authenticity of a national culture. By doing this, it 
both accepts and rejects the hegemony of a foreign 
culture. This is the main feature of nationalist 
thought in the colonial world for Chatterjee.^® So, the 
dilemma of nationalist discourse lies in its 
simultaneous acceptance and rejection of the dominance 
of Western modernity.
What nationalist thought does, instead of breaking 
its tie with Western modernity, is to absorb the 
political life of the nation into the body of the state 
by declaring the latter as the representative of the 
nation, as "the principal mobilizer, planner, guarantor 
and legitimator of productive investment. The result is 
the construction of a community within which different 
subject-positions are dissolved into the national 
identity.
16 ibid., 32^33
Fuat Keyman^ "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism," New Perspectives on Turkey. 13(Fall 1995), 101,102
19
As a result, national identity both in Western and 
non-Western societies is defined on similar grounds. 
Hence, the idea of national identity as homogeneous, 
integrated, fixed, stable and ahistorical has become 
rapidly globalised with only few exceptions. It is such 
an understanding of national identity, which is under 
challenge because of the dynamics caused by 
globalization, which will be dealt in more detail in 
the next section.
1.2 Globalization as a Contradictory Process
Globalization has been defined in many different 
ways. Some scholars have defined it as solely a process 
of homogenisation, as the world's becoming an 
integrated place or as some has put it, a process of 
Americanization. On the other hand, another approach to 
the phenomenon of globalization has questioned this 
one-dimensional definition. Robertson, for instance, 
claims that through globalization the world has in many 
ways become a united place, but in no ways an 
integrated one.^® He himself defines globalization as
Roland Robertson, "Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization 
as the Central Concept," in Global Culture: Nationalism, 
Globalization and Modernity, ed. M. Featherstone, (London, Sage 
Publications, 1990), 18
20
"a massive, twofold process involving the 
interpenetration of the universalisation of 
particularism and the particularisation of 
universalism.Similarly, Arjun Appadurai identifies 
globalization with the tension between cultural 
homogenisation and cultural heterogenisation.
According to him, the main feature of globalization is 
"the mutual effort of sameness and difference to 
cannibalise one another. Defined in this way as a 
two folded, or better to say, contradictory process, 
globalization can highlight many of the developments of 
our day such as the resurgence of ethnic identities, 
the erosion of national identity, and the rise of 
religious fundamentalism. Therefore, it would be useful 
to have a closer examination of globalization as a 
contradictory process.
Fuat Keyman emphasizes this contradictory 
character of globalization as such:
The process of contemporary globalization in 
its most general form involves a tension between 
universalism and particularism (see Robertson, 
1992, pp. 8-61) . On the one hand, with Francis
Roland Robertson; "Social Theory, Cultural Relativity and the 
Problem of Globality," in Culture, Globalization and the World 
System, ed. A. D. King, (USA, MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991), 73
Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global 
Cultural Economy," in Global Culture, ed. M. Featherstone, 
(London, Sage Publications,1990), 328
Roland Robertson, "Social Theory", 11
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Fukuyama's "the end of history thesis" which 
suggests universalisation of liberal democracy, 
along with the globalization of free market 
ideology, the dissolution of differences into 
sameness can be said to mark an emergence of 
cultural homogenisation. On the other hand, it can 
be suggested that particularistic conflicts have 
begun to dictate the mode of articulation of 
political practises and ideological/discursive 
forms in global relations, which draws our 
attention to the tendency towards cultural 
heterogenization. Arjun Appadurai asserts in this 
context that "the central problem of today's 
global interactions is the tension between 
cultural homogenisation and cultural 
heterogenisation.
Stuart Hall develops a similar argument. Following 
his argument, globalization has a peculiar form of 
homogenisation. It is not an attempt to produce little 
mini-versions of Americanness everywhere. Rather, it 
aims to recognise and absorb differences within the 
larger framework of what is essentially an American 
conception of the world. It does not attempt to destroy 
those differences; on the contrary, it operates through 
them. Hall links this feature of globalization to the 
logic of capitalism -that capitalism operates only on 
contradictory terrain and advances by overcoming these 
contradictions.^^ Capitalism splits old societies and 
uses different forms of labour force. Some developments 
on the side of production and consumption further feed
Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism," 93,94
23 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 28-31
22
this process. According to Robertson, "the consumerist 
global capitalism of our time is wrapped into the 
increasingly thematized particular-universal relation­
ship in terms of the connection between globewide, 
universalistic supply and local, particularistic 
demand. The contemporary market thus involves the 
increasing interpenetration of culture and economy." 
And he continues: "the contemporary capitalist creation 
of consumers frequently involves tailoring of products 
to increasingly specialised regional, societal, ethnic, 
class and gender markets -so-called 'micro 
marketing'. Hence, the capital falls in love with 
difference, and the advertisements begin to sell 
cultural difference, as it is well illustrated in a 
billboard slogan of Mobil: "Our difference is our 
strength. Let us appreciate it."^®
This is closely linked to another point that Hall 
reminds us: It is the emphasis on the "pleasure of 
difference". You go around the world and do not come 
back with a "everything is the same" but rather, "how
24 Roland Robertson, "Social Theory," 74,75
Jonathan Rutherford, "Yuva Denilen Yer: Kimlik ve Farklılığın 
Kültürel Politikaları," in Kimlik: Topluluk, Kültür, Farklılık, 
ed. Jonathan Rutherford, (İstanbul, Sarmal Yayınevi, 1998), 11
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nice, everything is different".^’ The differences of 
every group, every culture is emphasised and 
underlined. This is "the exotica of difference.
Hall results with the claim that:
So the notion of globalization as a non­
contradictory, uncontested space in which 
everything is fully within the keeping of the 
institutions, so that they perfectly know where it 
is going, I simply do not believe, I think the 
story points to something else: that in order to
maintain its global position, capital has had to 
negotiate and by negotiate I mean it had to 
incorporate and partly reflect the differences it 
was trying to overcome. It had to try to get hold 
of, and neutralise, to some degree, the
differences. It is trying to constitute a world in 
which things are different. And that is the 
pleasure of it but the differences do not
29matter.
Having defined globalization as the interplay 
between contradictory dynamisms, the question now 
becomes what the emerging global culture is like -to 
the extent that we can talk about such a coherent 
global culture. As Featherstone reminds: "...there is
little prospect of a unified global culture, rather 
there are global cultures in plural."^” However, the 
process of homogenisation involves the circulation of a
Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 31 
Stuart Hall; Old and New Ethnicities; p.55
29 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 32,33
Mike Featherstone, "Global Culture: An Introduction," in Global 
Culture, ed. M. Featherstone, (London, Sage Publications,1990), 10
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set of shared values. According to Hall the emerging 
global mass culture is still centred in the West: It is 
the stories and the imagery of Western societies that 
are circulating around the globe. Its language is 
English but it is a new form of international language, 
not the same English as it was spoken in England. 
Rather, it is a hybrid culture reflecting the different
cultures over which it circulates. 31 Hence,
globalization, in this sense, is a celebration of the 
values of the West and their adaptation by different 
societies. However, as globalization also involves a 
dynamic of heterogenisation, it is not possible to 
identify the emerging global culture totally with the 
West and to label the process as one of Westernisation 
or Americanisation. Accordingly, Smith claims that the 
global culture is tied to no place or period -it is 
context-less, a true melange of disparate components 
drawn from everywhere and nowhere.
So, on the one hand, globalization is a 
homogenising process and involves the formation of a 
global mass culture. Through the communications
Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global," 28 
A. D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" 177
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network, the world gets smaller and as Jan Aart Schölte 
claims, "in the globalised world of today people can by 
various means relate with one another irrespective of 
their longitudinal and latitudinal position, as they 
were on a 'supraterritorial’ plane.Parallel to this 
feature of globalization, it also involves an 
announcement and celebration of Western modernity and 
values as universal. As Gillian Youngs claims, 
Fukuyama's thesis of 'the end of history' well 
illustrates such a celebration. Fukuyama declares the 
globalization of liberal democracy as a universal ideal 
and the highest rational form of human organisation. 
The thesis emphasises the universalisation of the 
values associated with liberal democracy and economic 
liberalism. Fukuyama's thesis could be argued to be the 
ultimate post-cold war discourse of globalization. It 
identifies the progressive imperatives and homogenising 
power of the liberal capitalist system, as an 
irresistible incorporating influence both economically
Jan Aart Schölte, "Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical 
Theory of Globalization," in Globalization: Theory and Practice, 
eds. E. Kofman and Gillian Youngs, (London, Pinter, 1996), 45
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and politically. It involves a sense that questions 
have been answered, ultimate solutions reached.
On the other hand, globalization involves an 
opposite dynamic with its emphasis on difference. As 
Hall puts it.
Through globalization, the emergence of new 
subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new 
regions, new communities, hitherto excluded from 
the major forms of cultural representation, unable 
to locate themselves except as decentred or 
subaltern, have acquired through struggle, 
sometimes in very marginalised ways, the means to 
speak for themselves for the first time. And the 
discourses of power in our society, the discourses 
of the dominant regimes, have been certainly 
threatened by this de-centred cultural empowerment 
of the marginal and the local.
Globalization brings forth a return to the local 
as a response to the uncertainties of the global. The 
local provides more stable, knowable identities and 
relations in a world where "the very idea of 
uncertainty promises to become globally 
institutionalised."^® Because of this very feature of 
globalization, it also involves an overall questioning 
of modernity. The ideas of progress, of the nation­
state as the major agent of history, of its capability
Gillian Youngs, "Dangers of Discourse: The Case of 
Globalization," in Globalization: Theory and Practice, eds. E. 
Kofman and Gillian Youngs, (London, Pinter, 1996), 65
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to narrate the whole population, the understanding of 
national-identity which defines the people as a 
homogeneous, integrated whole, are all under erosion. 
This is what gives globalization its contradictory 
character: It is the declaration of Western modernity
as universal on the one hand, and the questioning of 
the basic premises of that modernity on the other.
1.3 The Impact of Globalization on National Identity
National identity, in the course of its history, 
has performed two different roles in two different 
spheres. In the international sphere, nation-states and 
national identities have claimed their authenticity and 
cultural difference. In the domestic sphere, however, 
they have been the representatives of cultural 
uniformity and homogeneity. Through the process of 
globalization, both roles of national identity are 
under challenge.
As stated above, globalization has two opposite 
dynamics. On the one hand it is a process of 
homogenisation, and an accompanying declaration of 
Western modernity as universal. On the other, it is a 
process of heterogenisation, a return to the local and 
an accompanying questioning of the very principles of
28
modernity. It is the two processes at work 
simultaneously. And because of this very nature of 
globalization, it has two interrelated effects on 
national identity:
(i) Globalization brings forth a pressure over the 
national identity from above. Because self- 
determination is one of the basic principles of 
national identity, and one that gives it legitimacy, 
globalization has an eroding effect over it. National 
identity is defined on the premises of sovereignty and 
self-determination; it defines the nation as governing 
itself, making its own conscious choices. With the 
process of globalization, and growing global 
interdependence, such a premise starts to lose value 
and hence occurs diminish in the legitimacy grounds of 
national identity. Besides, the homogenising dynamics 
of globalization challenges the claim of national 
identity to cultural authenticity in the international 
sphere.
(ii) Globalization brings forth a challenge on 
national identity from below. First, the communication 
networks through which the global mass culture 
circulates, also makes possible a dense, more intense 
interaction between members of communities who share 
common cultural characteristics and this results in the
29
re-emergence of submerged ethnic communities and their 
nationalisms.^' Besides, the cultural homogeneity 
imposed by globalization generates identity-reinforcing 
reactions.^® Furthermore, the local identities offer 
individual a firmer ground against the cultural flux 
caused by globalization. As a result of these factors, 
the re-emerging local identities and loyalties bring 
forth serious pressure on the homogeneity claim of the 
national identity. The resurgence of local identities 
brings forth a questioning of the legitimacy of the 
homogeneous national identity. Those local identities, 
with the process of globalization, begin to struggle 
for representation in the public sphere and to become 
alternative definitions of collective identity.
These two challenges -from above and from below- 
are simultaneous, they are the two faces of the same 
process. As Hall puts it;
One of the things which happens when the 
nation-state begins to weaken, becoming less 
convincing and less powerful, is that the response 
seems to go in two ways simultaneously. It goes 
above the-nation-state and it goes below it. It 
goes global and local in the same moment. Global 
and local are the two faces of the same movement 
from one epoch of globalization, the one which has
'^a . D. Smith, "Towards a Global Culture?" 175 
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been dominated by the nation-state, the national 
economies, the national cultural identities, to 
something new.'^ ^
As a result, one the one hand, we are experiencing 
a process of cultural homogenisation; the world is 
becoming smaller, and transterritorial identities and 
organisations are finding their place in politics. On 
the other hand, we are experiencing the fragmentation 
of already-established national identities, ethnic 
revivals and religious fundamentalisms. Besides, those 
(re)emerging ethnic identities are struggling to become 
national identities and to form new totalities in many 
other parts of the globe. Globalization is a multi­
faceted process and has different impacts on national 
identities, which do not work the same way around the 
globe.
It should also be noted that the erosion and 
fragmentation of national identities certainly do not 
point to their totally disappearance. As a result of 
these fragmentations, there emerges a possibility of 
redefining national identity on a new basis, which 
recognises and accommodates the representation of local 
identities without repressing them to form a
homogeneous whole. However, there is also a contrary
39 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global" 27
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evidence that the national identities are being 
redefined on an even firmer basis than ever before as a 
response to such fragmenting dynamics. As Hall claims:
The erosion of the nation state, national 
economics and national cultural identities is a 
very complex and dangerous moment. Entities of 
power are dangerous when they are ascending and 
when they are declining and it is a moot point 
whether they are more dangerous in the second or 
the first moment...So when I say the decline or 
erosion of the nation state, do not for a moment 
imagine that the nation state is bowing off the 
stage of history...it goes into an even deeper 
trough of defensive exclusivism.
So the evidence seems to point to national 
identities entering a process of transformation and 
redefinition. But what the outcome of this process will 
be seems uncertain from this point of history. It may 
bring forth a more democratic definition or an even 
more homogeneous one. It seems more logical not to 
expect the final triumph of one over the other but 
rather a period of continuous struggle in which they 
will coexist.
40 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global" 25
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CHAPTER II
KEMALİST NATIONAL IDENTITY
As stated in the first chapter, globalization has 
contradictory dynamics with challenging effects on 
national identity. In the Turkish case, those effects 
started to be felt increasingly in the post-1980 
period. As a result, 1990s were marked with challenges 
to the Kemalist definition of national identity. In 
order to understand the emergence of such challenges, 
it is first necessary to look at those characteristics 
of Kemalism and its definition of national identity, 
which are being questioned today.
2.1 The Features Of Kemalist National Identity
Western Enlightenment and positivism were 
constitutive elements of Kemalist national identity as 
conceived and articulated by Kemalism. In the Kemalist 
conception. Enlightenment stands for a linear
understanding of history and an established reason as 
the core of reality. Kemalism regards positivism as an 
integral part of the Enlightenment that replaces
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metaphysics and religion with science as the means of 
conceiving that reality.
Dating back to Auguste Comte, positivism provided 
a conception of society that is subject to invariable 
laws. Science, as the means of conceiving those laws, 
makes social control possible. Hence comes order and 
progress. Therefore, if one of the important features 
of positivism is its emphasis on science for 
understanding and having control of social reality, 
another is its conceptualisation of society as based on 
harmony rather than conflict.
Feeding from these schools of thought, scienticism 
and modernisation are key elements of Kemalist national 
identity. Positivism gives the opportunity to ignore 
the impact of Christianity on Western civilisation 
because it replaces religion with science as the basis 
of that civilisation. Besides, it offers social harmony 
rather than conflict, which is a fruitful ground to 
build a homogeneous national identity on. The element 
of scienticism is very powerful in Kemalism. Mete 
Tungay quotes an interesting anecdote to illustrate 
this.^^ Grace Ellison, the writer of the book "Turkey
Mete Tunçay, T.C. 'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923- 
1931), (İstanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1992), 323
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Today" (written in 1928) talks to a schoolteacher while 
travelling from Konya to Adana, The teacher says: "Our 
prophet is Mustafa Kemal. We are finished with the guy 
from Arabia. Mohammed's religion was good for the Arabs 
but not for us." Then Ellison asks him whether he does 
not have any beliefs. He replies: "I do have. I believe 
in Mustafa Kemal, I believe in science, I believe in 
the future of my country and I believe in myself. The 
author asks "what about God?" The man replies: "Who can 
know anything about God? There exists science, there 
exists the power of good and bad and nobody can know 
anything about the rest."
One of the basic premises of Kemalism is that 
"science is the only true guide in life". This 
illustrates the belief in the assumption that the world 
has a rational order and that rational order can be 
conceived by human reason. All that is needed is to 
raise the Turkish nation to the necessary scientific 
level. Islam is seen as an obstacle to that end. 
Therefore religious moral values should be replaced by 
science. Hence August Comte's positivism is used as a 
new form of religion: a new but rational system of 
belief instead of the existing religion.
Levent Köker, Demokrasi Üzerine Yazılar, (Ankara, İmge 
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Another main feature of Kemalism is the emphasis 
it places on modernisation. Using the Enlightenment 
understanding of history, the claim to modernisation 
and progress are building blocks for Kemalist identity. 
Forming a nation-state and a national identity are seen 
as the prerequisites of modernisation. Since the 
establishment of the Republic, modernisation was 
considered as a state policy. The process of 
modernisation was identified with the nation-state. To 
oppose modernisation was viewed as opposing to the 
state, and to question the state was an adequate reason 
to be placed into the anti-modern camp.^^
In the light of this general framework, it is now 
necessary to look at the more specific features of 
Kemalist national identity. There are different 
approaches as regards the criteria on which national 
identity is defined in Kemalism. Some argue that 
Kemalism has a dual character. For instance, Taha Parla 
claims that Kemalist nationalism has a second face 
besides its cultural, humanist side based on law. This 
second face rests on ethnical unity and homogeneity and 
includes an ethnic domination, monopolism, and
Çağlar Keyder, "Kimlik Bunalımı, Aydınlar ve Devlet," in 
Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, 
Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 153
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exclusivism directed against minorities/^ Tanil Bora 
also points to the same ambivalence in Kemalist 
national identity. Such an ambivalence also exists in 
Western nationalisms but it is well hidden. It arises 
as a result of the duality between the political-legal 
definition of national identity based on the concept of 
citizenship on the one hand, and an essentialist, 
sacred definition of identity based on ethnicity on the 
other.However, the concept of citizenship is also 
more than a mere legal-political status in Kemalist 
national identity. It is a gained status, depending on 
the commitment to the nation. It is defined like a 
cultural identity and is linked to a performance.“*® The 
distance between citizenship and belonging to the 
nation and how separate these two statutes are, can be 
most easily seen in the position of minorities in 
Turkey. Non Muslim minorities, although they are 
entitled to equal citizenship rights, are not conceived
Taha Parla, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Cilt 
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as Turks in the sociological sense/® Turkish identity 
is not thought to suit especially to religious 
minorities.
Kemalist national identity is not a homogeneously 
well-defined block and such ambivalence about the 
ground it rests on may has occurred from time to time. 
The two different faces of Kemalist national identity 
have been emphasized differently at different times. 
However, it is the cultural definition that generally 
prevails. As Ergun Özbudun claims, when we take 
Kemalist national discourse as a whole, its legal, 
cultural side is the one that is more emphasized.^® 
Baskin Oran, after showing some ethnic implications of 
Kemalist national identity, concludes similarly. He 
claims that Atatürk's nationalism is definitely limited 
with the territory and its core is the concept of the 
Turkish nation defined on the criteria of common 
culture.^® Atatürk, himself, emphasised common culture, 
language and history as the constitutive elements of 
nation and defined nation on a cultural basis. He
Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi 
Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu," in Cumhuriyet^ 
Demokrasi ve Kimlik, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 
1997), 61
49 Ibid., 70
Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir 
İnceleme, (Ankara, Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 1988), 231-237
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listed the constitutive elements of Turkish national 
identity as:
-Political integrity 
-Linguistic integrity 
-A common history 
-A common morality 
-A common descent and race^^
In the 1931 and 1935 programs of the Republican 
People's Party, the nation is defined similarly on 
cultural grounds: "The nation is a political and social 
entity formed by the citizens bound to each other with 
a common language, culture and destiny.
Another striking point in these definitions, to 
which Levent Kdker draws our attention, is the absence 
of the element of religion, which could also be 
employed within the concept of culture. M. Kemal 
explains that absence as follows:
"Some claim that religious integrity is also 
important in the constitution of a nation. 
However, the Turkish case illustrates the 
opposite. Turks were a great nation before they 
accepted Islam as their religion, too. After they 
did so, Islam caused neither the Arabs nor the 
Acems who had the same religion to integrate with 
Turks to constitute a nation. Rather it caused to 
loosen the national bounds of Turkish people, it 
diminished their national feelings and
A.Afetinan, Medeni Bilgiler ve M.Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları, 
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excitements. This was very natural. Because, the 
aim of the religion established by Mohammed was to 
form a community transcending all nations
Kemalism tended to base the new social 
organisation it aimed to establish on the nation and to 
define nation with anti-religious elements. Religion 
was the ground for the traditional rather than the 
national state, so to separate religion from state was 
the first and essential step towards forming a nation­
state. So, religion would be limited to the individual 
sphere alone.
As can be seen from the above definitions, in 
spite of a continuous ambivalence, it is often the 
cultural and legal-political elements that are more 
emphasised within the Kemalist definition of Turkish 
national identity. Religion is often excluded from 
those definitions. However, it is important to 
underline an important point that Tanil Bora reminds 
us: A cultural identity defined as unchangeable and 
unique and made sacred, constitutes a ground for racism 
and essentialism. Turkish nationalism, even with its 
humanistic and universalistic claims, has such an 
essentialist understanding of identity. Turkish
Ibid., 152-153 
Ibid., 162,165
40
identity, as a constant entity independent of time, 
with its definition as a supreme category, is an 
illustration of such an essentialism. The Turkish 
nation is thought to exist with its national 
consciousness since the beginning of human history, as 
an ahistorical entity.What is important here is that 
although Kemalist national identity is defined more on 
a cultural basis than ethnical ones, it still is an 
essentialist understanding of identity as a constant, 
ahistorical, and sacred entity.
2.2 Kemalist National Identity as a Homogeneous 
Identity
Defined on the general grounds of positivism and 
modernity, the Kemalist definition of Turkish national 
identity takes the nation as a homogeneous whole. The 
Turkish nation is seen as an integrated whole without 
classes and without privileges. This ideological 
premise is partly supported by practice, too. The newly 
established Republic is no more a heterogeneous empire. 
At least, it has become more homogenous on a religious 
basis after the establishment of the Republic as a
65 Tanil Bora, "Cumhuriyetin îlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik," 56
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result of population exchanges and lost territories. 
Both in ideological and practical levels, there was an 
emphasis on the homogeneity of the population. As 
Çağlar Keyder claims, in the ideological sphere, that 
claim to homogeneity was used as a legitimising ground 
for the state: "If there was a homogeneous nation with 
a common past, their interests and future goals should 
have been common, too. The state would be the narrator 
and the agent to realise those common goals and 
interests. Therefore, opposition to state, or to put it 
in a better way, to question the state's ability to 
represent the nation was something unacceptable."^®
Consequently, the establishment of the republic 
also marked the transition from a multi-national empire 
to a new political structure in which a single, 
redefined nation was dominant.^' By the time of the 
establishment of the Republic, the nation has become 
much more homogeneous than it was under Ottoman Empire, 
at least on religious grounds. However, the claim to 
homogeneity was not only on religious ground. Ethnic 
divergences and differences based on social class were 
also totally ignored. This feature of Kemalist national
Çağlar Keyder, "Kimlik Bunalımı," 153
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identity became explicit only after the foundation of 
the Turkish Republic. As Ergun Özbudun claims, 
throughout the years of independence war, concepts like 
Turkish nationalism and being Turk were not pronounced. 
The community was defined by traditional elements such 
as Ottoman Empire and Islam. Furthermore, the community 
was not seen as a monolithic entity but rather, it was 
recognised as being formed of different elements. 
However, these were the results of the conditions of 
war and the necessity to form alliances. As the regime 
was consolidated, such a pluralistic discourse was left 
and Turkish nationalism was emphasised.^®
Baskin Oran, similarly, points to that 
transformation. He claims that throughout the years of 
the War of Independence, the phase "Nation of Turkey" 
was used to define the population. However, after the 
end of the war, the sensitivity was over and the name 
used was "Turkish nation". The phrase, "the nation of 
Turkey" was never used again in Atatürk's speeches
after 1923. 59
Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele," 64-66 
Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, 164
43
Atatürk himself, in one of his speeches in 1920, 
well illustrates that sensitivity during the years of 
war: He accepts that the nation that they are trying to 
defend is certainly not formed of one element. Rather, 
it is constituted of several Muslim elements. All the 
Muslim groups, constituting the whole, are brothers and 
the citizens have shared interests.®®
As it can be seen, during the years of the war, 
the necessity to form alliances with other groups (such 
as Islamist conservatives and non-Turkish Muslim 
minorities) resulted in such a sensitivity in using the 
nationalist discourse and for the same reasons, Islam 
was used as a unifying and defining element of the 
population. However, after the solidification of the 
republic, the attitude was replaced with a strict 
denial of any claim to difference either based on 
ethnicity or social classes.
There were said to be no class conflicts in Turkey 
because there were no conflicting interests of 
different groups. Rather, society was defined on an 
occupational basis: the occupational groups, based on 
the principle of division of labour, work for the 
common good and each needs the others in order to
60 Ergun Özbudun, "Milli Mücadele," 66
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survive. There is one common interest of the whole 
society and the state is the representative or it would 
be better to say, the materialised form of that common 
good. Atatürk himself claims that "conceiving the 
Turkish nation not as constituted by different classes 
but as a society divided into different occupational 
groups based on the principle of the division of labour 
in order to supply individual and public survival" has 
been one of their essential principles. The work of 
each group is necessary for the survival and happiness 
of the others and for the society as a who l e . O n e  
outcome of this feature was the legitimation of one 
party rule. There are two implications of such a 
definition. First, the liberal state is seen as a 
damaging factor for national solidarity. It opens the 
way for class conflict. Nation-state ideal, on the 
other hand, rejects classes and offers integrity and 
unity of the nation. Therefore, it is the nation-state 
principle, rather than the liberal state principle, 
which is thought to be suitable for the Turkish nation. 
Only the idea of the classless nation-state corresponds 
to the realities of the country. Secondly, by defining
Zafer Toprak, "Aydrn, Ulus-Devlet ve Popülizm," in TürJc Aydını 
ve Kimlik Sorunu, ed. Sabahattin Şen, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları,
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Turkey as a classless unity and entitling the state as 
the representative of the shared interests of that 
unity, the need for the existence of different parties 
was outdated. Such a need, which was a characteristic 
of the West, was the result of the existence of 
conflicting interests and classes in society. This was 
not suitable for the social realities of Turkey. The 
nation, the state and the party were identified and the 
Republican Party was seen as the only legitimate organ 
to represent the interests of the nation. The 
questioning of the party's capability to represent the 
nation was unacceptable. However, this claim to a 
classless society was later left and the existence of 
social classes and therefore the need for different 
political parties were recognised.
Similar to the attitude to the existence of 
classes, the existence of ethnicities was also denied. 
Everyone living within the Turkish territory was said 
to be a Turk. Once again comes the question of the 
identity defined on the legal status of citizenship 
versus the ethnic nationalist principle. What is 
implied by the denial of ethnic differences is not only 
the sameness gained by the equal status of citizenship. 
Rather, there is an implied claim to homogeneity in the 
ethnic sense, a reference to a common decent and race.
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In order to support such a claim, tremendous effort was 
given to the studies on Turkish history and language. 
The Turkish history and language thesis formulated at 
the time well illustrates this enthusiasm.
The claim to homogeneity is closely tied to a 
constitutive element of Turkish identity: the fear of 
fragmentation and division. After experiencing a long 
period of fragmentation and division the Turkish nation 
and republic was formed as a response and a means to 
prevent any further divisions. As a result, such a fear 
-or it is better to say 'phobia'- was an internal 
constitutive element of national identity. The outcome 
was the denial of the existence of ethnic minorities 
and any demand from a non-Turkish group was conceived 
as part of a plan to divide the country by the
centre.62
2.3 The Question of 'Other' For Turkish National 
Identity
Any identity, individual or collective, is formed 
against the image of the other. We are what the "other" 
is not. Further more, identities are not frozen.
Taner Akçam, Türkiye'yi Yeniden Düşünmek, (Istanbul, Birikim 
Yayınlara, 1995), 24
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constant entities. Rather, they are constituted against 
continuously redefined "others". An Arabic phrase well 
summarizes this: "I against my brother, my brother and 
I against our nephew, my brother, our nephew and I 
against the whole world.
Therefore, in order to develop a holistic 
understanding of Kemalist national identity, it is 
important to examine the "other" against which such an 
identity was constituted.
Tanil Bora claims that the other for Turkish 
national identity was not the Kurds or the minorities. 
It was not Greece or West either. Rather, Turkish 
identity was constituted by including the Western 
identity in its body. He claims that it is difficult to 
find the 'other' of Turkish national identity outside. 
Rather such an "other" is internal to the social- 
historical reality of Turkey. It is the "Ancient 
Turkey", it is the Ottoman Empire, and it is the old 
civilisation in which the religious worldview was 
dominant. Choosing its own history as the other, 
national identity also redefines that past. According 
to this new definition, the Ottoman Empire was the 
obstacle that kept the potential of Turkish people
‘’^ Bozkurt Güvenç, "Açış Konuşmaları," in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve 
Kimlik, ed. Nuri Bilgin, (İstanbul, Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), 27
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underdeveloped and prevented its progress. Islam is 
thought of as a potential for reviving that old 
civilisation and the Ottoman legacy. The Arabic 
identity is seen as linked to that ancient identity and 
serves as an external other.
Sevda Alanku§ Kural, on the other hand, claims 
that the Kurdish population fulfils the role of the 
external other. According to her, Kurds were the most 
important group that Turkish modernisation process left 
outside. The ideal of Turkish modernisation was to form 
a homogeneous nation and the discourse reflecting that 
ideal excluded those who were not Turks or who were not 
conceiving themselves as Turks. As a result of the 
phobia of separatist movements, the Kurds, who were the 
only ethnic group with a separatist history were seen 
as potential enemies and external others.
Though these two claims seem to offer different
answers to the same question. they are not very
separate . What they share in common is that the
imperial past based on religious ground constituted the
internal other to Turkish national identity. It was not
Islam per se that was defined as the other but rather
Tanıl Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik," 58,59 
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the ancient structure legitimised through religion. 
Islam was used as far as it constituted a ground to 
integrate the population. However, efforts were made to 
rationalise Islam. What was opposed was the irrational 
form of the religion caused by the religious clerks and 
what was to be done was to purify Islam, which was in 
fact compatible and even parallel to reason and 
science. On the other hand, the Arabic or Kurdish 
identity constituted external others for Turkish 
national identity with different emphasise on one or 
the other from time to time. What made these identities 
suitable for an external other was their relatedness to 
the ancient order of the Ottoman Empire and the fear of 
separatist movements which both identities had a past 
to revoke such a fear.
Hence was the Kemalist national identity defined 
against these others, and the definition of these 
others by the new Turkish State was a constitutive 
element of the national identity. As stated earlier, 
the claim to homogeneity has been one of the chief 
features of that definition. However, in the post-1980 
period, this feature of Kemalist national identity has 
been one of the most questioned components of Kemalism. 
Similarly, the relation of Kemalism with religious and 
ethnic -mainly Kurdish- identities was problematised.
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Such challenges were the outcomes of complex processes 
experienced in the post-1980 period, which will be the 
main concern of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON TURKEY,
THE POST-1980 PERIOD
Having evaluated the basic features of Kemalism and 
its formulation of national identity, the question now 
becomes how and why these premises were challenged in 
the post-1980 period. However, before passing to that 
period, it will be useful to review the social, 
economical and political transformations that Turkey 
has experienced until 1980s. Only after that it will be 
possible to understand the developments of post-1980s 
and the current situation in Turkey.
3.1 A Brief Historical Review Of The Pre-1980 Period
The basic premises of Kemalist nationalism and its 
definition of the national identity were outlined in 
the previous chapter. These premises were solidified 
through the six major principles of Kemalism and the 
Republican Peoples Party (RPP). Under the conditions of 
one-party rule, and with very little space for
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opposition, these principles were set into practise 
through a series of reforms.
The reforms had a wide spectrum, ranging from 
matters of daily life (such as regulation of clothes) 
to those of law (such as the replacement of sharia with 
the Civil Law). However, the reforms had a common 
orientation, that of "imitating the superstructural 
aspects of Western capitalist modernization,"®® One 
important step was the adaptation of Latin alphabet. 
This did not only aim to increase the percentage of 
literate population but also contributed to the 
loosening of the ties with the Ottoman past. According 
to Zürcher, this was a way of breaking Turkish society 
off the religious traditions of Ottomans and the Middle 
East and to direct it to the West.®^ These reforms were 
accompanied by the establishment of new institutions 
such as Turkish Language Institution and Turkish 
History Institution. Through these changes, the 
national identity ideal of Kemalism was indoctrinated 
over the population. Both the educational institutions 
and the press were mobilized to spread the Kemalist 
ideology. Many people, especially writers, teachers.
Çağlar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy." 
New Left Review. 115(May-June 1979), 12
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doctors, the self-employed and students, adopted the 
Kemalist vision of modern, secular and independent 
Turkey.®® However, it would not be true to claim that 
these changes meet with no resistance and were easily 
accepted by the masses. In spite of the lack of 
opposition mechanisms, there emerged a discontent in 
some parts of the population, including the 
reactionaries as well as the ordinary Muslim people. 
The two short-lived experiments of transition to multi­
party system (one of which was personally initiated by 
Atatürk) displayed the extent of social unrest. 
However, it was only in 1940s, a few years after 
Atatürk's death, that this unrest could be materialised 
as an opposition party.
In the economic sphere, the free economy of 1920s, 
as a result of the crisis caused by the world-wide 
decline in agricultural prices and the resulting trade 
deficits, was transformed into etatism and strict state 
control after 1929. The state-led economy resulted in 
an increase in industrial production, accompanied by 
oppressive measures against workers and declining 
earnings in agriculture. Together with the militant 
secularism, economic worsening further alienated the
6 B Ibid.^ 263
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peasantry, exporting landowners and petty bourgeoisie 
from the regime. The Second World War even worsened the 
situation, with shortages, rising prices, falling wages 
and black-markets.
In this respect, the end of the Second World War 
marked the beginning of a new era for Turkey as it 
pointed to the triumph and celebration of democratic 
principles throughout the world. In such an 
international atmosphere, together with the rising 
Soviet threat and USA's new approach through Marshall 
Plan and promotion of an open economy, a democratic 
transformation was becoming more beneficial for Turkey. 
As far as domestic politics was concerned, there was a 
widespread discontent in the society, accelerated by 
the negative challenges of the War. Besides, the 
alliance between the military/ bureaucratic elites, 
landowners and bourgeoisie had eroded.®^ Soon, the 
first signals of the softening of one-party rule were 
seen in İnönü's speeches. The Democrat Party (DP) was 
established in 1946 by the former opposition wing of 
RPP. There was not a sharp ideological difference 
between RPP and DP. In the following years, the 
boundaries between the two parties became more blurred
Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu, (İstanbul, Sarmal 
Yayınevi, 1994), 148
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as RPP adopted a more liberal policy in order to 
prevent the flow of support to DP.
Furthermore, the party began to give concessions 
from its strict secularism -a legacy from Atatürk's 
era. This was the beginning of the decline of Kemalist 
militant secularism, which later continued in the 
Democrat era. In line with this softening, optional 
religion courses were put in the curriculum. According 
to Ahmad, the Republican party even promised to remove 
the Kemalist principles from the Constitution if re­
elected. 7 0
In spite of all these measures, DP won the 1950 
elections with a majority and Democrats (and together 
with them, a new elite) came to power where they would 
stay for the next ten years. Keyder calls this "a 
decisive shift in Turkey's history from elite rule to 
full class rule, and from one pattern of capitalist
71development to another."
In the first years, the agricultural export 
economy, with the help of the boom created by the 
Korean War, caused an economic dynamism and as a 
result, the party increased its votes in 1954
Ibid., 155
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elections.In fact, the transformation of economy 
towards a more liberal one began in 1947, when İnönü, 
in line with the IMF requirements, implemented a series 
of measures including devaluation of Turkish Lira and 
import permissions. The policies of DP, aiding 
agricultural industrialization and promoting exports, 
satisfied the expectations.
However, the situation started to change in 1954, 
together with the declining export earnings and growing 
trade deficits, the growth rate started to decrease 
whereas inflation increased. In spite of the continuing 
high incomes in agricultural sector (as a result of 
state subsidies), the wage earners —most importantly 
bureaucrats and military members— experienced a drastic 
(¿0Ç;;j _ I h their income as a result of the inflationary 
policies. The economic crisis also enstrangered the 
commercial and industrial sectors of bourgeoisie from 
the party. This resulted in a decrease of support 
(mainly the urban support) to DP and a following 
increase of the authoritarian tendencies in the party 
policies. Hence, after 1954, the Democrats began to 
sacrifice political liberalism for the sake of  ^the
72 Ibid.^ 24
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economic. Opposition in and outside the party, 
together with the social tension increased. The tension 
came to a peak in September 1955 when, the protests 
about the situation in Cyprus turned into a massacre 
and was followed by an increase in authoritarian 
measures.
The 1957 elections was an important decline for DP 
for it lost its parliamentary majority. During the 
election campaigns, DP used religious issues in order 
to increase its support base and was criticised by RPP 
and other intellectuals for violating the principle of 
secularism, which pointed to the further alienation of 
the urban elite from the party.
Actually, the strict secularism of 1930s and 40s 
started to soften with the transition to multi-party 
politics as a result of the political parties' interest 
in attracting the votes of the Muslim population. 
During 1950s, DP leaders were very sensitive to 
emphasize that they would not allow any change in the 
secular characteristic of the state. Once in power, 
they assumed a more tolerant attitude towards religion. 
The Turkish Ezan was replaced with the Arabic, 
religious education extended, and the number of
73 Feroz Ahmads Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu, 335
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religious schools increased. As the party started to 
loose its support, its emphasis on religion grew 
further. With this attitude, they disturbed the 
educated elite's (including buraucrats, teachers, 
military members, etc) cultural hegemony. As a 
result, the criticism against DP grew more and more and 
the party v;as blamed for betraying the Kemalist 
tradition. Meanwhile, economic decline, together with 
the social tension and government repression continued 
to increase. Finally, on 27 May 1960, the first 
military intervention took place, opening the path for 
the two future interventions, in the name of preventing 
the fight between brothers and recovering democracy 
from the crisis that it faced.
As a result of the military take-over. Committee 
of National Unity (CNU) , formed by the coup leaders, 
took the power. However, the committee was not 
homogeneous in itself and soon, its radical wing, lead 
by Tiirke§ (who would later become the leader of ultra­
nationalist movement) was eliminated. After that, the 
new democratic institutions started to be constituted. 
The Constitutional Assembly formed the new constitution 
which was different from its precedent and aimed to
Erick Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi, 339-340
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strengthen alternative power centers other than the 
parliament in order to prevent a monopoly of power. 
With this goal in hand, the Republic Senate was formed 
as the second chamber of National Assembly, an 
independent Constitutional Court was constituted, the 
autonomy of judiciary, university and media was
granted.
Another important outcome of the coup and the 
widening scope of political activity allowed by 1960 
Constitution was the establishment of Turkish Labour 
Party, the first "ideology based" party contesting in 
the national elections. And with its existence, the 
Labour Party forced the other political parties to 
define themselves clearly in ideological terms. 
Meanwhile, leftist movements were gaining popularity 
among students and industrial workers.
Like the political sphere, 1960 marked important 
transformations in the economic sphere. One point of 
criticism towards DP coming from both the military and 
RPP (and also supported by the modern industrial 
bourgeoisie) was the lack of economic planning. The 
haphazard running of economy was seen as the main
Ibid., 357
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reason causing the economic decline. Hence, one of the 
results of the coup has been the establishment of State 
Planning Organization in September 1960 to form five 
year plans. In fact, Turkey was among the last of the 
developing economies to adopt a system of comprehensive 
planning.'^ A second outcome was, the adaptation of 
import substitution model accompanied by import 
limitations and control over exchange rates. Besides, 
high wage increases for industrial workers were allowed 
in order to create a dynamic domestic market. These 
general economic policies were followed by different 
governments and Turkish economy, within this protected 
environment and oriented towards internal market, 
experienced a period of growth.
After the referendum on the new constitution in 
June, national elections were held in October 1961. 
However, the Democrat Party was closed, its leaders 
trialed, and three of them, including the ex-prime 
minister, were punished with death penalty. The newly 
established Justice Party (JP) was the major successor 
of the Democrat Party. RPP won the 1961 elections by 
only getting slightly more votes than JP, proving that 
DP's appeal to the rural masses was continuing.
” Morris Singer, "The Economic Performance of Turkish Republic." 
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Actually, after a period of coalition governments, 
when the 1965 elections were held (during which such 
topics as socialism, capitalism, land reform, foreign 
policy and economic development were debated at length 
for the first time^ ®) JP, led by Demirel got a majority 
and stayed in power for five years. The party itself 
was a coalition of industrialists, tradesmen, 
landowners and villigers, religious reactionaries and 
Western liberals. The party employed two strategies for 
electoral success: emphasis on religious and 
traditional values on the one hand and anti-communist 
propaganda on the other.
Although DP and its leaders were criticised for 
using the religion for political aims and for 
jeopardizing the secularist principle, there has not 
been a return to the militant secularist and anti- 
Islamist politics of pre-1945 period after the coup. 
Hence, JP found the chance to use religious feelings to 
increase its support.
The anti-communist discourse and the campaign to 
beat leftist movements (who were severely criticizing 
JP policies) was supported also by CNU. However, it was 
taken so far by JP that, finally, one of Atatürk's
J.S. Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections: 1965." The Middle East 
Journal. 20(1996), p.473
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speeches was included into the scope of communist
propaganda. However, JP did not have the chance to 
totally repress its opponents and rule arbitrarily as 
its precedessor, DP, because of the equilibrium 
established by 1960 Constitution.
Because of the above mentioned policies of 
religious and anti-communist propaganda, JP lost its 
appeal among urban intellectuals. However, it continued 
to be supported by the rural population as the 1969 
elections proved. This was partly the result of the 
economic situation. The second half of 1960s were years 
of economic boom and development for Turkey and real 
incomes showed a steady increase as a result of the 
import substitution policies implemented since 1960. 
Hence, JP continued to be the major party in 1969 
elections with only a slight fall.
Meanwhile, RPP was experiencing a period of 
transformation. There was a growing belief, represented 
by Ecevit, that the party’s faith was closely tied to 
the votes of the workers and squatter population. With 
the support of İnönü, the party shifted towards the 
"Left of Center", with a program emphasizing social
Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi, 366
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justice and security. In spite of this shift, the party 
could not gain an electoral victory.
The shift in RPP was the result of a social 
transformation. The 1960s were the years of rapid 
change. Social and physical mobility was increasing. As 
a result of the inner migrations, shantytowns became 
usual around large cities. There was a growing student 
and industrial worker population. As a result of the 
liberal atmosphere created by the 1960 Constitution, 
intellectual debates were taking place on social and 
political issues and many periodicals were being 
published. The growing strength of the left was not 
unique to Turkey, but rather, were accompanied by 
similar developments throughout the world. However, the 
left was very fragmented among different groups and 
parties, (some of which favored political violence) and 
the Labour Party was also divided towards the end of 
the decade.
Meanwhile, on the right wing of the political 
spectrum, new parties were being formed on more 
extremist basis. The first was the Republican Peasant 
Nation Party (soon to be called Nationalist Movement 
Party-NMP) lead by Turke?. The party emphasized ultra­
nationalist and anti-communist elements and was not far 
from violence. The second party, (National Salvation
64
Party-NSP) emphasized religious elements and was lead 
by Erbakan. The two parties together formed a threat to 
JP which rested on a loose coalition. Meanwhile, 
different sectors of bourgeoisie with differentiated 
interests were forcing JP to make a choice. As JP 
increasingly implemented policies that served the 
interests of industrial bourgeoisie, its electoral 
base, namely the farmers and petty bourgeoisie, started 
to alienate from the party and shift towards the 
Islamic and radical nationalist parties.
The growing opposition within JP came to a peak in
1970 and the government was forced to resign. The new 
government formed by Demirel was unable to control the 
increasing radicalism among left and right movements 
and the growing political violence and could not pass 
any social or economical reform package from the 
parliament in the first months of 1971.
The growing tension was followed by the 12 March
1971 military intervention through a memorandum given 
by generals that asked for the resignation of the 
government and the implementation of a reform program. 
After JP resigned, a new government was formed by 
technocrats. With the amendments in 1971 and 1973, the
Ibid., 370
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constitution was shifted towards a more authoritarian 
line. However, the socio-economic reform program was 
not realised.
The repression of the left has followed. One 
outcome of this move was the ending of the progressive 
role that was seen fit to the army by some of the 
leftist groups who saw the military as a natural ally. 
From then on, the military was conceived as a potential 
threat by most of the leftist movements.®^
Actually, the social and economic crisis prior to 
the intervention was not that deep to necessitate a 
military intervention. However, the increasing social 
and political dynamism and the growing leftist 
tendencies among students and workers, which was a new 
experience in Turkey, were conceived as a threat by the 
ruling elites who could not enjoy a widely accepted 
consensus within the society.®^
As a result of such a discontent, a conservative- 
authoritarian cultural policy was followed under the 
label of Atatürkism. Both the RPP-NSP coalition and the 
National Font coalitions that followed confronted with
M. T. Müftüoğlu, and Yavuz Sabuncu, Türkiye ile Batı Dünyası 
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such a line, with a growing emphasis on nationalism, 
religion and morality.
However, the political violence continued its 
increase in the 1975-1980 period. Besides, there was a 
growing economic crisis, accelerated by the rise of oil 
prices. Furthermore, there was a political unstability 
as a result of the weak coalition governments (6 
governments between 1975-80, 2 of which could not get a 
vote of confidence) . Although RPP increased its 
strength as a result of its "left of center" politics 
and the growing prestige of Ecevit because of the 
Cyprus crisis, non of the parties were able to come to 
power alone. This situation increased the influence of 
small radical parties in a manner unproportional to 
their electoral base. Hence, the political system was 
paralised towards the end of 1970s. Such a paralysis 
resulted in the disability to take any measures against 
the growing terrorism. Besides, the tension further 
increased when the 'seperatist Kurdish Labour Party 
(PKK) was established in 1978.
In the economic sphere, it was no longer possible 
to sustain the economic growth through the import 
substitution model. As a result of the model's 
dependence on the import of intermediate goods and raw 
materials, there was a growing foreign trade deficit
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and foreign dept, and the repayment capacity was 
exhausted. In fact, the payment crisis was postponed 
upto that time with the help of foreign borrowings and 
remittances from Turkish workers in Germany. However, 
the oil crisis of the 1970s further deepened the 
crisis.
As a result of the negotiations with IMF, World 
Bank and OECD in 1978 and 1979, new credits were 
granted to Turkey on the condition that a reform 
package (including the lifting of import limitations, 
cutting of the state subsidies, decreasing state 
expenditures, increasing prices and strict control of 
wages) would be implemented. The reform package, then 
after known as 24 January decisions, was put into 
motion after Demirel came to power. However, the 
decisions meet with a widespread resistance as they 
have foreseen a download pressure on worker wages and 
agricultural support prices. The activities of the 
unions prevented the realisation of the program. Soon 
it became clear that it was very difficult for the 
civil government to implement the decisions within the 
atmosphere of political tension, turmoil and terror. 
One last resort within the limits of parliamentary 
democracy seemed to be a "grand coalition" between JP
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and RPP.®^ However, the deep polarization in the 
society and the differing interests soon dismissed this 
possibility, too.
The political unstability, increasing terrorism, 
Kurdish seperatism, the growing economic crisis, the 
inability to restructure the economy and the rising 
threat of Islamic fundemantalism resulted in the 1980 
military coup. This was the beginning of an era of 
important transformations in political, social and 
economic spheres together with the process of Turkey's 
articulation with global capitalism. As a result of 
those transformations, the Kemalist definition of 
national identity, in a totally new sense, became the 
question. This very feature of the post-1980 period 
differentiates it from the early years that were 
reviewed above. The pecularity of the period and the 
nature of those transformations will be dealt with in 
detail in the next section.
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3.2 The Post-1980 Period and Turkey's Articulation with 
the Globalization Process
The year 1980 marked a turning point for Turkey in 
many respects. In September 1980, a military coup took 
place, abolishing democratic institutions for a three- 
year period. In 1982, the new constitution was put into 
effect and a year later, in November 1983, a return to 
parliamentary procedures was realised. However, 1980 
marked a much more intense shift for Turkey in 
economic, political and social terms, namely, the 
country's articulation to global capitalist process.
As stated in the previous section, in the late 
1970s, Turkey experienced a high degree of economic and 
political instability. Import-substitution, the 
dominant economic model of accumulation in Turkey 
proved inefficient vis-a-vis the oil crisis and the 
country experienced a serious economic crisis. The 
political space was highly polarised and the weak 
coalition governments were unable to create political 
and economic stability.
The military came to power on the ground that 
democratic mechanisms were unable to overcome political 
instability and the economic crisis. The main objective 
was "to inject a substantial measure of stability into
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the political system” and in this way, "to eliminate 
any potential threats to the consolidation of the 
market-oriented reform process by accomplishing a 
series of measures designed to depoliticise the 
economy.Immediately, political parties, interest 
associations and labour unions were closed and the 
party leaders were banned from political activity.
The 1982 constitution was accepted and put into 
effect after a referendum. The constitution, quite 
different from its precedent, was marked with the 
limitation of the power of legislation, the increasing 
power of the executive and president, the decline in 
the independence of judiciary and the end of the 
autonomy of institutions like universities and TRT 
(Turkish Radio and Television)Civic associations 
were restricted in their activities and social rights 
were strictly limited. Contrary to the 1961 
Constitution, the 1982 Constitution, borrowing Binnaz 
Toprak's terms, aimed to strengthen the state against
civil society 86
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As Ziya Öniş claims, two actions taken by the 
military at the time had far-reaching consequences.®^ 
The first was the employment of Islam by the military 
elite as a means of social control. With the major aim 
of weakening the political power of the left, they 
formulated the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', bringing 
together nationalist and religious elements. This new 
discourse was institutionalised in the 1982
Constitution through a set of parallel legislations 
such as compulsory religious education in primary and 
secondary schools. This was an important shift for 
Turkey, a shift of state identity from radical 
secularist to "neo-republican" in which Kemalist 
principles were no longer seen as the only means for
providing national uniformity 88 Although the
employment of Islamic discourse, as Fuat Keyman puts 
it, "was considered by the regime to be a temporary and 
short-term pragmatic strategy to restructure the 
political and to restore the performative power of the 
Kemalist republican state", the move "weakened very 
conditions of existence of Kemalist nationalism and the
Ziya Öni?, "The Political Economy," 749
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republican s t a t e . A s  a result, although the military 
regime had a Kemalist orientation, it opened "a 
discursive space for the revitalisation of the language 
of difference, a discursive space which created a 
possibility for the marginalised and silenced identity 
to surface and express its resistance to the national 
secular identity."®®
The second critical action of the military regime, 
according to Ziya Ôniç, was the closure of political 
parties and the bans imposed on their leaders. Besides, 
a 10% national threshold in order to limit the 
participation of small parties, became a law. However, 
these measures, taken in order to maintain political 
stability, contributed to the further fragmentation of 
the party system with the return of the banned 
politicians to politics in 1987. The result was two 
separate parties on both centre right and centre left, 
hence, a relative weakening on both sides, providing an 
opportunity for more marginal parties.®^
With the national elections of 1983, a return to 
parliamentary democracy was realised. In spite of the
0 9 E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism," 112
Ibid., 113
Ziya Ôniç, "The Political Economy," 751
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support of military regime for another party, the neo­
liberal Motherland Party was the winner of the 
election. The Motherland Party represented an attempt 
"to synthesise market modernism and Muslim identity, 
with its loyalty to Muslim conservatism together with a 
strong commitment to economic liberalism. Turgut Ozal, 
the head of the party, "represented the new identity 
and ideal, since he defined himself as both 'a Muslim 
and m o d e r n ' . I n  fact, the party's electoral success 
was partly the outcome of the discourse of the Turkish- 
Islamic synthesis employed by the military regime. Once 
in power, the party was further "instrumental in the 
integration of Islamists into Turkey's hierarchy of 
power and status, as the party had an influential 
Islamist clique within its leadership ranks.
The post-1980 period marked important 
transformations with far-reaching consequences also in 
the economic sphere. The transformation of the Turkish 
economy gave its first signals with the declaration of 
a structural adjustment program in January 1980. The 
period beginning with the military intervention meant
Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: 
the Case of Turkey," in Civil Society in the Middle East, ed. A.R. 
Norton, (Leidon, E.J.Brill, 1996), 30
” Ibid., 32
Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society," 108
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the realisation of the fact that Turkey had no 
alternative other than opening its economy to the West 
and the accompanying demand to be articulated with 
global capitalism unconditionally.^^ Hence, a new phase 
of adjustments under IMF directions took place. The 
traditional model of industrialisation through import- 
substitution was replaced with export-oriented growth 
through the free-market. Restrictions on imports were 
lifted, the Turkish lira was adjusted to international 
rates of exchange, and state subsidies were reduced. 
Much more emphasis was made on market forces, 
liberalisation of the economy and privatisation. The 
structural adjustment programs of the post-1980 period 
had important impacts on the Turkish economy. An 
increase in the sectoral share of industry in economy 
(from 23.8% in 1979 to 30.1% in 1992), in the share of 
total exports (from 2.7% in 1979 to 9.1% in 1992) and 
in the share of manufacturing exports within total 
exports (from 34.7% in 1979 to 82.8% in 1992) was
experienced. 96
Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 90 
Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society," 102
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The economic transformations of the post-1980 
period had important social outcomes, too. For the 
first time in Republican history, the urban population 
exceeded the rural population. The urban culture, 
especially in metropolitan areas was opened to 
international influence. Through the spread of 
telephone lines and increasing usage of fax machines, 
computers, satellite broadcasts of international 
television companies, private televisions and radios, 
Turkish society was increasingly linked with the global 
communications network. The media gained an increasing 
strength in public-opinion making. There was also an 
increase in international travel. Hence, the economic 
transformations brought forth important changes in the 
social structure.
Up until 1980s, Kemalist principles and national 
identity determined the path to civilisation in Turkey. 
The constitution of the nation-state and the definition 
of national identity were deeply shaped by what Fuat 
Keyman calls, the Kemalist will to civilisation. As he 
notes, "the shift in industrialisation was in fact the 
transformation of the 'Kemalist will to civilisation' 
to 'civilisation via laissez-faire', which was 
fundamentally contradictory with the Kemalist image of 
the organic state." In this way, the post-1980 period
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was marked not only with the export-oriented 
integration of Turkey to global capitalism, but also a 
growing crisis of Kemalist nationalism to reproduce its 
hegemony.
3.3 Turkey in the Globalization Process
As it was noted above, the post-1980 period was 
marked by significant transformations in the Turkish 
Republic. One main reason of these overall 
transformations in economic, political and social 
spheres was the country's articulation to the global 
process beginning with 1980.
One major impact of this articulation through the 
transformation of economic model towards an export 
oriented one and the opening up of the Turkish economy 
to global capitalism, was the growing crisis of 
Kemalist ideology and national identity. The crisis was 
firstly initiated with the growing inability of 
Kemalist discourse to motivate the nation towards 
civilisation within the project of modernity. 
Furthermore, the 1980s were marked by the celebration 
of market economy and the globalization of
Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and 
Nationalism," 111,112
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coininunication and culture. Since the inid-1980s, Turkey 
experienced a process of increasing cultural 
encounters, both between its east and west and with the 
global culture as a whole. This has challenged the 
existing definitions of identity and created new 
conceptualisations of ’us’ and the 'other
Therefore, such a crisis of Kemalism emerged 
simultaneously with another process in which the "total 
exposure of Turkish society to global modernity was 
radically transforming identity-conceptions and social 
configurations into ambivalence and uncertainty."^® 
Hence, Turkey has experienced a period since 1983 in 
which many traditional values, conceptions and 
institutions, together with the basic premises of 
Kemalist nationalism and national identity have been 
questioned and challenged.
One reflection of these questionings was the 
debate over the Second Republic, which will be 
evaluated in more detail below. Another parallel 
consequence was the rise of different identity 
definitions, which throughout the long history of the
98 Sevda Alankuş Kurala "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 90
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republic were neglected and kept in the private realm, 
and their accompanying struggle to exist in the public 
sphere. The rise of Islamic identity and Kurdish 
nationalism was the most significant developments in
each of which deserves a separate
terms of its inner dynamics. Besides,
and the feminist movement also became
in the public sphere. These new
conceptions of identity were initiated by the process 
of globalization, through which large proportions of 
the population experienced a physical and cultural 
dislocation. These localities, as Sevda Alanku§ Kural 
calls them, provided their holders with the feeling of 
belongingness and locatedness vis a vis the uncertainty 
and ambiguity caused by the global p r o c e s s . O n  the 
other hand, all of these movements with their emphasis 
on 'difference' challenged the homogeneous, unifying 
definition of national identity by Kemalism. As Fuat 
Keyman claims:
The present political landscape in Turkey 
exemplifies very clearly the tension between the 
universal and particular, where at stake is the 
clash between the secular national identity as the 
bearer of cultural homogenisation and the 
revitalization of the language of difference 
through the rise of Islam, the re-emergence of 
Kurdish nationalism in organised form, and the 
feminist movement that has been effective in
101 Sevda Alankuş Kural^ "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 87
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putting the 'women question' at the centre of the 
process of 'rewriting Turkish historiography'.^®^
In return, these developments have also
contributed to the formation of a response, namely the
simultaneous rise of Turkish nationalism, or as Tanil
Bora defines it, "the dark spring of nationalism."^®^
This national awakening, which will be the main concern
of the next chapter, was partly the result of the
social and cultural dislocation caused by the
globalization process and partly a reaction to the rise
of identities. Hence, the period was marked by
seemingly contradictory, but closely related
developments.
3.3.1 The Second Republic Debates in Turkey
One of the reflections of the transformations 
caused by globalization in Turkey has been the debates 
over the Second Republic. The debates were initiated by 
a number of journalists and soon were joined by a 
number of social scientists and politicians. The 
supporters of the Second Republic criticised the anti-
102 Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and
Nationalism," 95
Tanil Bora, Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı, (Istanbul, Birikim 
Yayınları, 1995)
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democratic structure of the Turkish State and Kemalist 
principles. They emphasised the necessity of 
establishing a new consensus. The main points of 
criticisms were the inefficient, huge and authoritarian 
state, the anti-democratic 1982 Constitution, the role 
of the military in politics, and the homogeneous 
conceptualisation of national identity by Kemalism. 
What the supporters of Second Republic proposed instead 
was a liberal economy and a minimal state, a new 
constitution, decentralisation, stronger civil society 
and a new approach in state-society relations.
The criticism of Kemalist principles and national 
identity constituted one core of the Second Republic 
debate. Kemalist ideology was criticised for its 
emphasis on sameness and for trying to create a one- 
type population, namely a Turkish, Muslim, Sunni 
population. It was blamed for forcing the population to 
deny its own identity and culture. It was said that 
those identities which were banned for long years had 
now came to the surface again and Turkey was trying to 
get rid of the narrow suit that it was forced to put 
on. Hence, a new conceptualisation of national
Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar eds, 2. Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları, 
(Ankara, Başak Yayınları, 1993), several places
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identity, taking also in consideration the Kurdish, 
Islamic, Alevi elements, was required.
The serious criticisms of Kemalism and its 
definition of national identity were quite new 
phenomena in Turkey. This was a step towards breaking a 
taboo in the society and a sign of the growing 
challenge to the hegemony of Kemalist discourse.
A simultaneous and related debate was initiated by 
Neo-Ottomanists who claimed that the world, after the 
collapse of socialism, has started to resemble its 
condition before the First World War, with only the 
Ottoman Empire missing. Especially, with the collapse 
of USSR, new opportunities appeared before Turkey to 
establish closer relations with the Turkic Republics, 
the Balkans and the Middle East. What Turkey should do 
was to develop an 'imperial vision', transcend the 
limits of Misak-i Milli and increase its power in the
105region.
Another related debate was initiated by an 
Islamist intellectual, Ali Bulaç, who proposed a 
reorganisation of society based on the model of the 
Medina Agreement. The model was based on the peaceful 
coexistence of different communities all with their own
Cengiz Çandar, in 2.Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları, eds. Metin Sever 
and Cem Dizdar, (Ankara, Başak Yayınları, 1993), 103-106
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law systems within s o c i e t y A c c o r d i n g  to Bulaç's 
project, the model would constitute the base of the 
civil society. The proposal immediately promoted new 
debates with the participation of left-wing 
intellectuals, and marked the inclusion and 
contribution of Islamic intelligentsia to the debates 
around the discourse of identity and difference. As a 
result, "groups both within the Islamist and the 
secular intelligentsia have adopted a postmodernist 
discourse, the former arguing for a legal system based 
on separate law for different communities of belief, 
while the latter are questioning the universalist 
claims of the republic and calling for its 
dismantlement in favour of a decentralised 'Second 
Republic’
The significance of the debates on the Second 
Republic, Neo-Ottomanism and the Medina Agreement was 
that they were the reflections of the substantial 
transformations that the country had experienced 
through the process of globalization. The basic 
propositions brought forth in these debates were 
parallel to actual developments like the articulation
All Bulaç, "Sözleşme Temelinde Toplumsal Proje." Birikim. 
40(1992)
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of Turkey to global capitalism, the celebration of 
liberal economy, the rise of identities, and the 
challenges to Kemalist principles and national 
identity. As can be expected, the debates also created 
a large number of opponents, especially among the 
Kemalist intelligentsia, who doubted that through the 
changes proposed by the pro-group, the principle of 
secularism and the unitary structure of the nation­
state would be jeopardised. This group generally 
employed the Kemalist understanding of the national 
identity as it was formulated in the early years of the 
republic -as a homogenous, ahistorical, stable entity. 
Nevertheless, the debates contributed to the creation 
of a discursive space where new issues, as well as the 
old ones that used to be taboos before, entered into 
the agenda of public debate.
3.3.2 The Rise of Islamic Identity in Turkey:
The post-1980 period, together with some other 
important developments, was also marked by the rise of 
Islamic identity and political Islam. Within the same 
period of time, in which "the social reconstruction of 
Turkish modernisation took important strides forward, 
the economy was radically liberalised, and a smooth
84
transition to a post-coup democratic regime was almost 
thoroughly accomplished, Islam also emerged as an 
important political variable. Although the two 
developments seemed quite contradictory and it could be 
expected that the former set of developments should 
lead to a decline in the latter; in fact they were two 
different outcomes of the same process of 
transformation experienced in the post-1980 Turkey.
As noted above, one main reason behind the rise of 
Islam was its practical employment by the military 
regime to consolidate social and political stability 
and to weaken the power of the left. This move of the 
military regime unintentionally opened up the path for 
the revival of Islamic identity. Such developments like 
compulsory religion education and the increase in the 
number of schools giving religious education 
contributed deeply to this process. After the return to 
parliamentary politics, the Motherland Party, with its 
ideal of forming a synthesis between Islam and 
modernity, further accelerated this process. The 
developments were accompanied with the emergence of 
Islamic organisations (both in the form of political
100 F. Birtek and F. Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas"
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Party -the Welfare Party, and Islamic brotherhoods) 
and the increasing visibility of Islamic identity in 
the public sphere. The turban affair, through which 
Islamic women were made the representative of and the
display window for political Islam, 110 was the
crystallisation of this increasing visibility.
Along with these inner dynamics, globalization and 
the social and cultural dislocation accompanying it, 
contributed to a large extent to the rise of Islamic 
identity. Not only did it cause a weakening of Kemalist 
national identity but also it gave rise to religious 
identity definitions and a resurgence of communitarian 
loyalties, which provided a solid ground for
individuals against the flux and ambiguity that 
globalization, has caused. As Fuat Keyman notes, 
"Islamic discourse acted successfully as an
articulating principle of resistance to such 
uncertainty by identifying ambivalence with global 
modernity and certainty with community, that is, with a
During the course of this study, the Welfare Party, as a result 
of the developments beginning in 28 February 1997 and with the 
smooth intervention of military, was closed in 16 January 1998 by 
a decision of the Constitutional Court and some of its leading 
figures, including Erbakan, were banned to be a member of a 
political party for a five-year period. The newly established 
Virtue Party emerged as the party’s successor.
Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Türkiye’de Alternatif Kamular/Cemaatler 
ve İslamcı Kadın Kimliği." Toplum ve Bilim, 72(Spring 1997), 9
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turn to religion.Hence Islam with its communitarian 
bounds, provided a shelter for the atomised individual, 
especially in the urban space where he faced the flux 
of modernity all alone and provided an answer to his 
"search for greater certainty, control and 
protection. The religious community represented "a 
high degree of personal closeness, emotional depth and 
moral submission. The rise of Welfare Party in the 
last decade was partly an outcome of this dynamic; and 
because it has found such a social ground for its 
ideology in urban places, it gained an important 
electoral victory especially in the metropolitan areas 
like Ankara and Istanbul.
The Welfare Party, as a result of the above noted 
dynamics as well as some other factors such as the 
fragmentation of the party system and weakening of the 
centre and the inability of traditional parties to 
provide any solutions to the social, economic and
111 Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and
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cultural crisis, arose as a political force in 1990s 
The party made a Third-Worldist emphasis, favoured an 
economic model of 'just order', criticised the 
traditional definition of secularism and claimed to be 
'truly secular', and employed an Islamic version of 
nationalism, portraying Turkey as the leader of the 
Islamic world. The party's ability "to differentiate 
itself sharply from the established parties of the 
political order", and to appear as an alternative "at a 
time when, as part of global trends, the sharp 
divisions between centre-right and social-democratic 
parties have largely been blurred", contributed largely
to its electoral success. 116
Further more, the party's organisational strength 
was also an important factor of its rise. The party 
employed "grassroots organisations and face-to-face 
contact" and established closed, personalised relations 
with the electorate. Women's participation was 
crucial in forming such relations as they campaigned 
from home to home and hence "mobilised women's realm.
For an evaluation of the dynamics behind the rise of Welfare 
Party and the party's basic features, see Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat 
Ne Demokrasi, Refah Partisini Anlamak, (İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 
1994)
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the interior, a space totally dismissed by the secular 
centrist p a r t i e s . S u c h  a strategy of personalised 
relations was important in the increasing support of 
the party, especially at a time when the atomised 
individuals facing the flux of globalization, were in 
search for new sources of solidarity. Another source of 
electoral strength of the Welfare Party was Southeast 
Anatolia, where the Kurdish population was dense. One 
of the main reasons behind the appeal of Welfare Party 
to Kurdish population was, as noted by A.Y. Saribay, 
the rise of religious nationalism which represented the 
shift from the ethnic group towards the religious 
community as the base of nationalism.
To sum up, apart from the internal factors, the 
rise of the political Islam in Turkey in the post-1980 
period was to an important extent determined by 
transformations in social, cultural and economic sphere 
that took place as a result of the globalization 
process. Those transformations brought forth the 
dynamics of resurgence of Islamic identity in the 
public sphere and carried Islam from periphery to the 
centre.
Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism," 30
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3.3.3 The Rise of Kurdish Nationalism:
The second development that challenged the
unifying and homogeneous conceptualisation of national 
identity was the rise of Kurdish identity and 
nationalist movement. The Kurdish issue was not a new 
phenomenon in Turkey, and in fact had some of its roots 
in the Ottoman Empire and the early years of 
republic.However, the developments that took place 
after the 1980 military coup, and the following social 
and cultural transformations initiated by the process 
of globalization gave new dynamics to the issue and 
contributed to the emergence of Kurdish question as a 
question of identity. The challenges to Kemalist 
national identity, the resurgence of local identities 
as a result of the dislocations caused by globalization 
and the cultural encounters through the communication 
networks, as in the case of the rise of Islamic 
identity, also acted as some of dynamics behind the 
rise of Kurdish nationalism.
Murat Beige, Türkler ve Kürtler: Nereden Nereye?, 1995; p.384-
386
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However, there was an important difference between 
the two cases. The employment of Islam and growing 
tolerance for it did not comply with the attitude taken 
towards the Kurdish question by the military regime. 
The "new tolerance for Islam...was not extended to the 
Kurdish cultural community for fear of national 
disintegration. On the contrary, the military, as a 
reaction to the fragmentation of national unity prior 
to the 1980 take-over, employed a very intolerant 
attitude towards the issue, based on the denial of 
Kurdish existence as a distinct ethnic. Parallel to 
this, no expressions of Kurdish identity were allowed, 
and an effort was made to make the public believe that 
the Kurds were true Turks. Even a theory was formulated 
claiming that Kurds were mountain Turks, and their name 
has come from the sound of snow under their footsteps. 
Besides, the ban on Kurdish language was implemented 
strictly. Meanwhile, PKK was increasing its strength in 
the region, where all possible legal Kurdish opposition 
was suppressed by the military regime.
ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Historicizing the Present and 
Problematizing the Future of the Kurdish Problem: A Critique of 
the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question." New Perspectives on 
Turkey. 14(Spring 1996), 11
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The first signal of a change in this denial 
approach came froiti the General Chief of Military when 
he explained why the solution of the problem in South 
East was taking a long time with its similarity with 
the Basque question in Spain or IRA in Ireland/^^ In 
1991 Ozal announced that laws would be amended to make 
the use of Kurdish possible and he himself initiated a 
debate about the possibility of federalism. He "seemed 
to look at Islam as a unifying identity over and above
ethnic differences.”123
A new step in the approach towards the Kurdish 
question was the publication of a report, "Eastern 
Question-Diagnoses and Facts" by Doğu Ergil under the 
sponsorship of an influential interest group, the Union 
of Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges 
( T O B B ) The report combined "empirical and conceptual 
data to explain the roots and consequences of Kurdish 
nationalism" and tried "to portray Kurds in their own
Murat Beige, Türkler ve Kürtler, 393
Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe" in 
Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. S. Hall and P. Du Gay, 
(London, Sage, 1996), 75
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July 1995
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environment, speaking for themselves about their 
identity and present social reality."
According to the report, the ethnic notion of 
Turkish nationalism, envisaging a homogeneous national 
identity, contributed to the rise of Kurdish 
nationalism. The Eastern question was put forward as a 
problem of identity, with a 40% population in the 
region referring to Kurdish ethnicity as the basis of 
their identity according to the r e p o r t . T h e  rise of 
Kurdish nationalism was explained by the structural 
inequalities between east and west, as a result of 
uneven development.
However, the impact of globalization and the 
social and economic transformations accompanying it 
were neglected by the report. The new ideas of cultural 
difference and diversity accelerated by those 
processes, as well as the increasing contact of Kurds 
with both other parts of Turkey and the world as a 
result of migrations and communication networks 
contributed the emergence and recognition of the 
Kurdish question as an identity problem. As Sakallioglu
ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, " Historicizing the Present and 
Problematizing the Future," 3
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claims, "Kurdish nationalism is largely the product of 
new ideas on the value of identity which a changing 
global infrastructure has made available.
127 Ibid., 15
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CHAPTER IV
THE RISE OF NATIONALIST DISCOURSE
The developments that Turkey experienced in the 
post-1980 period with its articulation with global 
capitalism had important and far-reaching social and 
cultural outcomes. As a result of the dynamics of 
globalization which have promoted a cultural flux and 
uncertainty, a resurgence of identities like the 
Islamic and the Kurdish identity was witnessed. On the 
other hand, these developments challenged Kemalism's 
ability to reproduce its hegemony; Kemalist principles 
and definition of national identity were questioned by 
different groups in society. People started to
"publicly debate and criticise the Kemalist doctrine as 
a patriarchal and anti-democratic imposition from above 
that has negated the historical and cultural experience 
of the people in Turkey. In a hitherto unprecedented 
tone, the Kemalist path of modernisation, far from 
being an exemplary success story, is declared a 
historical failure that undermined the normative order
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Ottoman-Turkish s o c i e t y . T h e  Kemalist definition of 
the nation as a homogeneous whole was no longer as 
widely accepted as it used to be, and different groups 
started to claim recognition for their differences. The 
concept of "identity crisis" has become a popular tool 
in explaining the post-1980 situation in Turkey. Hence, 
one feature of the post-1980 period in Turkey was that 
the religious and ethnic identities that were limited 
to the private domain in order not to be a barrier in 
front of the national identity building process of 
Kemalism, have gained representation and visibility in 
the public sphere and started to struggle for political 
participation.
However, all these developments did not point to a 
decline or disappearance of Turkish nationalism. To the 
contrary, the post-1980 period, marked with the rise of 
identities, was also a period of rise for Turkish 
nationalism. Globalization, not paradoxically.
encouraged and provoked nationalist tendencies. 130 As
noted earlier, these tendencies were partly the result
S. Bozdoğan and R. Kasaba eds. Rethinking Modernity and 
National Identity in Turkey, (Seattle, University of Washington 
Press, 1997),4
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of the cultural dislocation caused by globalization and 
partly a response to the 'rise of identities'. The 
phobia of dissolution and separation has, from the 
beginning, been a constitutive element of Turkish 
nationalism. As Nilüfer Göle puts it.
The shared aversion of the intelligentsia and 
the army to the autonomization of civil society in 
politics- whether expressed through Islamism, 
Kurdish identity, leftist ideology or liberalism­
shaped Kemalism, the ideology underpinning the 
Turkish mode of Westernisation. Throughout 
Republican history, these four phobias -whose 
relative importance varied with the conjuncture- 
constituted the ideological rationale for 
political authoritarianism.^^^
Now, with the rise of different identities, this 
phobia has turned into paranoia, perceiving any demand 
for political representation and participation from 
these groups as a challenge to the unity of the nation, 
a process which in turn, further accelerated the 
nationalist tendencies.
Further more, the nationalist elites are not 
willing to share their power with any other authority 
neither from belove or from above. The elites in the 
nation-states like Turkey, which formed their national 
integrity with the second wave of nationalism, could 
only constituted their power quite recently and could 
not enjoy its advanteges fully yet. Therefore, they do
131 Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism," 20
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not want to share it with another authority. Under 
these circumstances, the cultural demands of local 
identities and their struggle to exist in the public 
sphere with their differences is perceived by the 
nationalist elites as a threat and provocation.
Although the current situation involves a 
challenge to the nationalist discourse, it also 
accommodates new opportunities. As Can Kozanoglu 
rightly claims, the loose structure of the language of 
nationalism enables it to articulate with almost all 
the different conceptualisations of i d e n t i t y . A s  a 
result of this loose structure, both the Islamic 
discourse and the Kurdish movement employ nationalist 
elements in different degrees. Therefore, the 
nationalist discourse, either in its Kemalist version 
or in a new form, has an opportunity to reassure its 
hegemony by articulating with these different 
conceptualisations of identity. In this struggle for 
hegemony, there are different versions of nationalism 
competing with each other. Here, the classification
132 Sevda Alankuş Kurala "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler^" 92
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made by Tanil Bora will be followed to examine these 
different versions of nationalism.“ ^
The first version of nationalism is the official 
nationalism. The official nationalism is marked by a 
tension between its civic elements and ethnic/cultural 
elements. The nationalist rituals have a vital 
importance. In spite of this, the official nationalist 
discourse has an artificial, cold impression and is not 
very attractive to the masses. With the 1990s, a spread 
and popularisation of the symbols of official 
nationalism, like Turkish flag, map, Turkish national 
anthem and Atatürk portraits, was witnessed. This was 
partly due to the rise of Welfare Party and the 
attitudes of some of its members against Atatürk and 
partly to the growing nationalist tendency against 
Kurdish question. Despite this popularisation of 
symbols, state-centred nationalism preserves its 
coldness and can not evolve into a mode of mass 
participation and motivation. However, official 
nationalism continues to be a source of legitimation 
and hence to legitimise itself- especially through its
134 Tanıl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati," 12-22
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relation with more popular and exciting versions of
nationalism. 135
A second version of nationalism is offered by the 
left. Although there were serious challenges to 
Kemalism from the social democratic intelligentsia 
during the 19B0s, it regained its strength in 1990s 
among left. This was a reaction against the New-Right 
hegemony, the rise of Islam and the anti-Kemalist 
attitudes. This new Kemalists claimed that Kemalism was 
excluded by the military rule after 1980 coup, and was 
no longer the official ideology. Secularism was the key 
element of the demand for a Kemalist restructuring 
against religious revival. In fact, nationalism was 
functional for making secularism more popular and for 
forming a basis of cooperation with the state and army 
against the rising religious threat. Hence, nationalism 
has been a tool to articulate neo-Kemalism with the 
official one.^^®
The third version is the liberal neo-nationalism 
of the post 1980 period. It defines national identity 
on the basis of the motivation and potential for 
Westernisation. Its basis is the will for civilisation
Ibid., 12-14 
Ibid., 14,15
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and economic development. The supporters of the liberal 
nationalism are especially among the media, liberal and 
conservative intelligentsia, the new urban middle- 
classes, and the sector of capitalists that have 
articulated with international capital. Economy has a 
privileged place in this discourse. Economic dynamism 
is the main source of national pride. However, the main 
measure of this dynamism is the level of approximation 
with world markets in terms of consumption. The measure 
of civilisation and compliance with universal culture 
becomes the consumption habits. The most emphasised 
figure of this Euro-Turkish nationalism is the youth- 
especially urban upper or middle class youth. Even the 
physical outlook of the young urban population becomes 
a material for liberal nationalism. Liberal 
nationalism, while taking consumption as the indicator 
of modernisation, at the same time replaces high 
culture with popular culture. Hence, it carries the 
nationalist tendency to the domain of popular culture. 
In this way it distances itself, on the one hand, from 
the coldness of official nationalism and on the other, 
from the extremity of ethnic nationalism. Besides, with 
its appeal through media, its popularity and its yet 
loose structure, it carries the opportunity to
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articulate with other nationalisms and to become the 
dominant version.
The radical Turkish nationalism offers the fourth 
version of nationalist discourse. It rests on an 
ahistorical perception of the nation. It is mainly 
represented by National Movement Party and Ülkücü 
Movement. In the 1980s, parallel to the developments 
after the military coup, Islam was emphasised as a 
constitutive element of national identity by radical 
nationalism. In 1990s, the stress on Islam diminished 
and ethnical elements rised again as a result of the 
growing reaction Kurdish movement and the rise of pan- 
Turkism, which became more rational due to the external 
developments. On the basis of pan-Turkism and the 
support to the state against Kurdish nationalism, 
radical nationalism rehabilitated its relation with 
official nationalism. In this way, it came closer to 
both the state and the political centre and at the same 
time increased its popularity. Hence, it softened its 
extremist impression, and normalised. Ülkücü movement 
started to gain support among the urban upper and
Ibid., 16-20
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middle class youth. The symbols of radical nationalism 
popularised and the movement modernised itself.
It can be said that a fifth version of nationalism 
is offered by the Islamic movement and the Welfare 
party. In spite of the internationalist tendencies 
embedded in Islam, the party makes significant 
nationalist references. The basis of this nationalist 
reference is that Turkey is seen as the potential 
leader of Muslim world. However, the internationalism 
of Islam weakens the position of the party in the race 
of nationalism. However, this very characteristic of 
the party, namely its religious nationalism contributes 
to its appeal to Kurdish population.
In this multiplicity of nationalist discourses, 
there emerges new hybrid languages, coalitions between 
the traditionally contradictory world-views and the 
boundaries between left and right become even more 
blurred. In the struggle for hegemony, the new 
nationalism of post-1980 period, what Tanil Bora calls 
liberal nationalism, seems to have more chance than the 
other versions of nationalism, with its loose structure 
and appeal to the masses.This appeal is crystallised
Ibid., 20,21 
Ibid., 22 
Ibid., 16-20
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in the popularisation of nationalist symbols in the 
related period, such as the Turkish flags and Atatürk 
portraits. On the other hand, the official and radical 
nationalisms have the advantage of a more holistic 
discourse and a more developed response against the 
challenge of Kurdish movement. The growing fear of 
Sharia, further more, dresses the nationalist 
discourses employing secularism as a basic principle 
with a growing strength. Besides, it is quite difficult 
to predict the way in which religious nationalism will 
evolve at the moment.
To sum up, Turkey in the 1990s is experiencing a 
struggle for hegemony among different nationalist 
discourses. As a result of the process globalization, 
what is at stake is a process of articulation that will 
result in a new hegemony whose form is impossible to 
predict at the moment.
Sevda Alankuş Kural, "Yeni Hayali Kimlikler," 87
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CONCLUSION
Globalization, although not a totally new 
phenomenon, has been a process that had significant 
transforming influences on many aspects of life in the 
last decades. It is a twofold process, including both 
dynamics of cultural homogenisation and cultural 
heterogenisation. As a result of this contradictory 
dynamics, globalization has far-reaching effects on 
nation-states and the national identities on which they 
were built. Globalization, on the one hand, has 
challenged the sovereignty claim of nation-states in a 
world shaped by international dynamics to an important 
point. On the other hand, it has let to a fragmentation 
of the homogeneous cultures of nation-states and the 
re-emergence of local identities. Hence, the nation­
state and the national identity through which it was 
legitimised were challenged from two different 
dimensions, from above through international dynamics 
and cultural homogenisation, and from below through the 
resurgence of local identities with their fragmenting 
effect on the homogeneous national identity.
In Turkey, Kemalism, as the main carrier of 
Turkish modernisation, was also based on such a
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definition of national identity as a homogeneous, 
integrated entity. Built within the general framework 
of Western positivism and Enlightenment, national 
identity was defined as a homogenious, monolithic 
entity. Ethnic and class based differences were ignored 
and the population was seen from the point of sameness. 
Religion was not employed as a defining element of 
national identity and it was limited to the private 
sphere.
Defined on these grounds, Kemalist national 
identity is challenged by different dynamics today. 
First of all, its claim to modernisation and the 
state's role as the agent of that modernisation has 
been loosing its credibility. The claim to homogeneity 
has been questioned by different groups. As the Kurdish 
and Islamic movements accelerate and become more and 
more visible in the public sphere; we become more aware 
that we are not a homogenious whole as we used to 
think. We realise our differences and alternative 
definitions of collective identity are on the scene, 
competing with each other to become dominant.
The emergence of such challenges and alternative 
definitions of national identity were mainly a 
development of the post 1980 period in Turkey. The 
developments that Turkey experienced in the post-1980
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period and its articulation with global capitalism had 
important and far-reaching social and cultural 
outcomes. As a result of the dynamics of globalization 
which have promoted a cultural flux and uncertainty, a 
resurgence of identities like the Islamic and the 
Kurdish identity was witnessed. On the other hand, the 
developments challenged Kemalism's ability to reproduce 
its hegemony and the Kemalist principles and definition 
of national identity were questioned by different 
groups in society.
Consequently, as mentioned throughout the thesis, 
"identity crisis" as a prominent concept has become one 
of the major topics in the political agenda in the last 
two decades. Hence, one peculiarity of the post-1980 
period was that the religious and ethnic identities 
that were limited to the private domain started to 
claim recognition for their differences and 
representation in the public sphere. However, all these 
developments did not point to a decline or
disappearance of Turkish nationalism. To the contrary, 
the post-1980 period, marked with the rise of
identities, was also a period of rise for Turkish 
nationalism. Globalization, not paradoxically.
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encouraged and provoked nationalist tendencies. 
Besides, the loose structure of nationalist discourse 
enabled it to articulate with different definitions of 
collective identity. Both the Islamic discourse and the 
Kurdish movement appear to employ nationalist elements 
in different degrees. Hence, the nationalist discourse, 
either in its Kemalist version or in a new form, has 
gained a new opportunity to reassure its hegemony by 
articulating with these different conceptualisations of 
identity.
To sum up, as a result of the dislocations and 
relocations caused by the process globalization, Turkey 
in the 1990s, is experiencing a process of articulation
that will result in a new hegemony whose form is
impossible to predict at the moment. The national
identities are in a process of transformation and
redéfini ton both in the world and in Turkey. Such a 
process may result in a widening of democratic 
principles and a new definition of national identity 
that can cope up with the represantation of differences 
in the public sphere. However, the opportunity may also 
turn into a misfortune. Keeping in mind that those 
ethnic or religious groups, which struggle for
Tanıl Bora, "Melez Bir Dilin Kalın ve Düzensiz Lügati," 10
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representation, do impose a pressure of homogenisation 
upon their own members, it would be misleading to 
expect that democracy will be the inevitable outcome of 
the recognition of differences.
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